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Abstract
This dissertation looks at health behaviors of African women and the way
those behaviors are affected by information, incentives, peers, and own past
experiences. I focus on health service utilization by African women such as
vaccination and institutional delivery because the health facility utilization
remains severely limited in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, despite its high
effectiveness on health outcomes. The dissertation uses data that I collected
myself in Nigeria as well as Demographic and Health Survey data for 26
African countries to evaluate barriers to and incentives for health behaviors
among African women.
This first chapter causally evaluates the relative importance of psychic
costs as channels for low vaccination take-up compared to other barriers:
monetary costs and priming about disease severity. I measure each channel
by evaluating a field experiment among women which randomizes several
factors that affect tetanus vaccine take-up in rural Nigeria. This is the first
study to report the experimental evidence on psychic costs of vaccination.
Although conventional wisdom drawn from observational studies highlights
the relevance of psychic costs, I found no evidence that psychic costs limit
vaccination take-up. 95.7 percent of women who were incentivized just to
show up at a clinic, unconditional on vaccine take-up, chose to receive the vac-
cine anyway. Priming about disease severity using salient images of tetanus
patients increased perceived costs of disease but did not affect vaccination
x
take-up. Rather than these psychic costs being important barriers, direct
cash incentives had the largest effects on vaccination take-up. Small cash in-
centives increased vaccination take-up by almost 20 percentage points from
55 percent. The results in this paper confirm economic barriers to take-up
and find no evidence that psychic costs play a significant role, at least among
more than 85 percent of respondents who responded to cash incentives.
The second chapter examined the effect of the death of an infant on their
mothers’ health behaviors for their subsequent children, using Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHS) from 26 African countries. Child’s death induces
mother’s behavioral changes. I found that mothers who experienced the
death of their first child were 1.5 percentage points more likely to deliver
their second child with some assistance and 2.5 percentage points more likely
to deliver their second child at health facilities than mothers who did not
experience the first child’s death.
The third chapter analyzes the effect of social networks on vaccination
behaviors among women in rural Nigeria, using the same experimental data
that I used in Chapter 1. Social networks within village, neighborhoods,
and among friends all influence one’s vaccination decision to a great extent.
I find that the effect of one additional friend getting vaccinated increases
the likelihood of one’s receiving a vaccination by 17.2 percentage points.
Focusing on best friends, I additionally find that the effect of a best friend
receiving a vaccine on one’s vaccination decision varies by the distance to a
health clinic, by the distance between a woman and her best friend, and by
the belief about vaccine safety.
xi
Chapter 1
Psychic vs. Economic Barriers
to Vaccine Take-up:
Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Nigeria
1.1 Introduction
Every year vaccinations avert over a million deaths from tuberculosis, over
half a million from polio, and 800,000 from tetanus (Ehreth, 2003). Vac-
cination is an extremely cost-effective strategy to improve individual health
worldwide. For example, treating one case of measles costs 23 times the price
of one vaccination and $24 are saved for every $1 spent on the diphtheria-
tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine (Ehreth, 2003). Despite these benefits, there
still are an estimated 22.6 million infants annually who are not sufficiently
vaccinated worldwide, primarily in developing countries (WHO, 2014). Given
the large financial and health benefits of preventing disease, the relatively low
take-up rates remain a puzzle. This paper reports the results of a field ex-
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periment designed to evaluate various potential barriers to vaccination in
Nigeria, which is home to 12.4 % of the world’s unvaccinated infants.
Past studies have suggested various reasons for low vaccination take-up
based upon survey responses. They include monetary costs to attend health
clinics such as transportation costs and opportunity costs (Thysen et al,
2014; Uzochukwu et al., 2004), limited information about diseases and vacci-
nations (Orimadegun et al., 2014) and supply-side constraints such as vaccine
shortages (Santibanez et al., 2012). Furthermore, psychic costs, which are
residuals that cannot be explained by monetary reasons such as beliefs and
attitudes about vaccines, could be influential on vaccination decisions (Pe-
bley et al., 1996; Steele et al., 1996).1 Most past studies examined barriers
to vaccine take-up in qualitative ways, for example by asking subjects their
reasons for non-vaccination (DHS 2008; Jheeta and Newell, 2008; Nichter,
1995; UNICEF, 2001). However, such qualitative studies cannot identify the
causal effect of each barrier on vaccination behavior.2 This paper causally ex-
amines and compares the behavioral effect of monetary costs, psychic costs,
and perceived disease severity on vaccine take-up.
The examination of psychic costs, such as fear of needles or of side effects,
is of particular interest. The relevance of psychic costs as barriers to vacci-
nation has been widely documented in Africa. In northern Nigeria, a polio
vaccination campaign was famously boycotted by Islamic leaders due to false
rumors that polio vaccines make women infertile or contract HIV (Jegede,
1Examples of beliefs and attitudes about vaccines as psychic costs of vaccination include
fear of needles, fear of the vaccine safety such as side effects, misperception about vaccines
such as the belief that vaccines might give HIV or other diseases, and religious belief
against vaccines.
2Currie (2006) reviewed literature which examined the effect of stigma on the take-ups
of social benefits in developed countries. Stigma she used here is disutility arising from
participating awelfare program per se (Moffitt, 1983). She drew a general conclusion that
stigma is not a large barrier to participating in social benefits program. However, the
studies she cites provide suggestive evidence of small effects of stigma on benefit uptake,
and do not provide causal evidence.
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2007). This distrust against vaccine efficacy spread widely among the general
population, which led to the refusal of polio vaccinations by many people.
A similar incident opposed a tetanus vaccination campaign in Cameroon in
1990 (Feldman-Savlesberg, 2008), as well as polio vaccination campaigns in
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (UNICEF, 1997). These documents lead to
a common presumption by researchers that psychic costs of vaccination are
large barriers to vaccination. However, there has not been a causal study to
confirm these observations.
In order to causally measure the effect of each channel on vaccination take-
up, I implemented a field experiment in rural Nigeria that randomized several
factors focusing on tetanus vaccination among women. To address the effect
of monetary costs on vaccination, I randomized the size of conditional cash
transfers (CCT) provided to women conditional on their clinic attendance.
To study the effect of psychic costs on vaccination decisions, one group of
women had their CCT further conditioned on receiving the vaccine. Because
the only difference between these conditions was whether one was required to
receive a vaccine for cash incentives, the difference in clinic attendance under
these two conditions showed the effect of the psychic cost of being vaccinated
on the vaccination decision. I also randomized the disease message, either
a “scared-straight” message that emphasized the severity of tetanus or a
control message that provided the same information on tetanus without the
emphasis of disease severity, to address the effect of perceived disease severity
on vaccination while controlling for the information on disease.
I find that psychic costs of vaccination are not a large barrier to vaccina-
tion, contrary to the conventional wisdom from observational studies. The
clinic attendance of respondents who were offered cash compensation for
clinic visit but not required to receive a vaccination was not different from
the clinic attendance of respondents who were required to get a vaccination
at a clinic in order to receive cash compensation. Furthermore, an extremely
3
high proportion (95.7 percent) of women received a vaccination after they
visited a clinic, even though vaccination was not necessary for cash rewards.
This result indicates that psychic costs of vaccination are not significant as
barriers to vaccination. My finding contradicts previous observational stud-
ies which emphasize psychic costs as major barriers to vaccination (Rainey et
al., 2010). My study highlights the need for behavioral experiments, rather
than observational studies, to identify the causal relationship between psy-
chic costs and vaccination take-up. However, one limitation of the study is
that the result of small psychic costs is not generalizable to 13.3 percent of
respondents who refused to attend the clinic even at the highest amount of
CCT.
Monetary costs of clinic visits greatly affect the vaccine take-up. Con-
ditional cash incentives (CCT) significantly increase vaccination take-up by
compensating for monetary costs of clinic visits, i.e., transportation costs
and opportunity costs. Two dollars in cash incentives increased vaccination
take-up by 19.4 percentage points from 55.8 percent, while $5 increased the
take-up by 27.7 percentage points. $2 is about two-day earnings per per-
son, and a little over the average transportation costs (both way) to clinic
among those who needs to pay for transportation. While the larger monetary
costs of clinic visit significantly reduce the vaccination take-up, the effect of
the cash is stronger among those with larger monetary costs of clinic visits.
This result is consistent with the claim that cash incentives relax monetary
constraints for clinic visits. I also contribute to literature on the effect of
CCTs on behavior because this study is the first to use vaccination as a sole
conditionality for a CCT in a developing country (Barham and Maluccio,
2009).3
3Sutherland et al. (2008) conducted a review on the effect of cash incentives on vac-
cination rate in developed countries, and conlcuded that cash incentives were effective in
promoting the vaccination rate. Weaver (2014) found that cash incentives of 10 euros
increased the vaccine take-up by 27 percentage points.
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I find that priming about disease severity increases the perceived costs
of disease as intended, but it does not increase vaccination take-up. While
vaccine take-up was not enhanced by priming, it significantly increased the
perceived likelihood that respondents believed people die of tetanus. It also
increased the likelihood that respondents felt very worried about contracting
tetanus and that respondents thought tetanus was a very bad disease by 14.3
and 13.8 percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, priming increased
subjects’ heart rate by 6.27 beats per minute, implying that the priming
induces the emotional response. While this finding is consistent with some
of the recent literature on framing and fear appeals in developed countries
(Nyhan et al., 2014),4 I contribute to the literature because my study uses
improved measures such as actual vaccination behavior instead of hypotheti-
cal behavior, which has been commonly used in past studies. I measure heart
rates in order to objectively understand the emotional response to priming
intervention, in addition to commonly-used subjective measures of risk per-
ception.
Although my results suggest that psychic costs of vaccination are not the
large barriers, further studies need to evaluate the relevance of such psychic
costs among women who did not attend the clinic even if they were offered
the high amount of cash incentives.
1.2 Background
This section provides the overview of potential barriers to vaccination. I
address monetary costs, psychic costs, and salient information about disease
severity which have had support as channels of vaccine take-up in litera-
ture. This paper particularly focuses on conditional cash transfer (CCT) as
4Consistent with results from my study, Nyhan et al. (2014) found that priming altered
perceptions, but not the intended behaviors.
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a tool to compensate for monetary costs, and priming intervention as a tool
to convey salient information about disease severity. I also introduce the
tetanus-toxoid vaccine as a focus of the study.
1.2.1 Overcoming Barriers to Vaccination
This section introduces past studies that evaluated each channel influencing
vaccination behavior: conditional cash transfer and priming interventions
to increase vaccination take-up, and psychic costs as potential barriers to
vaccination. I introduce what past studies have not done to highlight the
contribution of my paper.
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)
Although conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have been successful
in promoting health behaviors in developing countries, their effects on vac-
cination have never been accurately measured. I accurately evaluate the
effect of CCT on vaccination take-up by implementing a rigorous experi-
ment. Because one of major barriers to vaccination is monetary costs such
as transportation cost and opportunity cost (WHO, 2008; Canavati et al.,
2011 ), one way to compensate for monetary barriers is to directly provide
cash incentives.5 In this section, I introduce the effect of conditional cash
transfer programs (CCTs) on vaccination.
Despite the success of CCTs in promoting health service utilization (La-
garde 2009), there has not been a CCT program that exclusively focuses
on vaccination take-up as a sole conditionality for receiving an incentive
5In addition to providing cash incentives to the demand side, we can also incentivize the
supply-side, for example, by providing financial incentives to maintain a certain standard
of service quality such as performance-based financing (PBF) (Meessen et al 2011). In
my study, I do not directly measure the effect of vaccine supply. Rather, I eliminate
the concerns of vaccine supply by informing respondents that there is sufficient vaccine
available for the project.
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(Barham and Maluccio, 2009). Rather, existing CCTs included vaccination
as one of the conditionalities along with other behaviors, such as regular
health check-ups and school attendance (Gertler 2004, Barham and Maluc-
cio 2009, Robertson et al. 2013). Thus, it has been difficult to identify
how cost-effective the CCT program is on vaccination take-up, as only the
combined effects of various conditionalities of CCTs have been measured.
Furthermore, it is found that effects of such CCTs with multiple condi-
tionalities on vaccination have been small and limited in developing countries
(Morris et al., 2004; Robertson et al., 2013; Barham and Maluccio, 2009;
Salinas-Rodr´ıguez and Manrique-Espinoza, 2013). Past studies might have
failed to find a large effect of CCTs on vaccination because multiple condi-
tionalities made it difficult to measure the accurate effect of CCT. Thus, my
study examines the effect of CCT with a sole conditionality to increase the
accuracy of measuring the effect of CCT on vaccination. One exception is a
study from Banerjee et al. (2010) which sets the children’s vaccination as a
sole conditionality and finds a large incentive effect. They found a large ef-
fect (20 percentage-points increase) of a small in-kind transfer (equivalent to
$2.85) on the vaccination rate among children. However, their study boosted
vaccination take-up through supply-side intervention as well; they set an im-
munization camp in each village. My study examines the effect of CCT with
one conditionality without controlling for supply side.
Psychic Costs of Vaccination
It is conventional wisdom that psychic costs, residuals that cannot be ex-
plained with monetary costs for vaccination take-up such as the fear of nee-
dles or the concern for the vaccine safety, are the large barrier that obstructs
people from vaccination. But the effects of psychic costs on vaccination have
not been causally tested. Thus I causally examine the behavioral effect of
psychic costs on vaccination.
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To highlight observational evidence on psychic costs of vaccination, I
provide two sets of qualitative evidence. First, Nigeria Demographic and
Health Survey (NDHS, 2008) revealed that more than one third of women
who did not take their children for vaccination indicated their reasons of non-
vaccination as psychic costs of vaccination (36.8 percent). They indicated
reasons of non-vaccination as fear of side effects, fear that their children
may get diseases from the vaccine, and because they thought that vaccines
did not work. Other reasons include a lack of information (27.2 percent) and
distance to a health clinic (13.4 percent). Psychic costs of receiving a vaccine
are mentioned by people as one of the major reasons of non-vaccination, and
this trend is not limited to Nigerian context. Rainey et al. (2010) conducted
a systematic review and also identified that psychic costs accounted for 17.2
percent of reasons of non-vaccination in 51 low and middle income countries.
Secondly, the Nigerian vaccination boycott campaign also demonstrates
the high psychic costs in the form of distrust against vaccines. It was ob-
served that three northern Nigerian states boycotted the polio immunization
campaign in 2003 due to a suspicion of the vaccine safety. Islamic lead-
ers propagated the suspicion to the public that polio vaccines could make
women infertile or contract HIV (Jegede 2007) which resulted in the refusal
of polio vaccine take-up by population. The boycott caused the decreased
acceptance of polio vaccine in northern Nigeria, the increased polio-virus
transmission throughout the country (Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, 2005), and the spread of polio into twenty countries (Kaufmann
and Feldbaum 2009). Similar refusal of vaccination campaign for polio and
tetanus due to distrust has been observed across Africa.
Priming about Disease Severity
Although the effectiveness of priming has been examined in previous studies,
results have been inconclusive. Using improved measures, I evaluate the effect
8
of priming intervention, which emphasizes the disease severity, on vaccination
take-up.
The potential effect of priming about disease severity can be considered
in the context of behavior change communication. This is based on the
utility maximization; information about the true effect of a health input
increases allocative efficiency by changing the perceived benefit (Grossman,
2000). It implies that if one invests in vaccination at a level that is less than
optimal, then providing accurate information should increase the perceived
benefit of vaccination and increase the demand for vaccination. In other
words, emphasizing the negative side of non-vaccination has a potential to
induce vaccination take-up by making the vaccine comparatively beneficial
by increasing the perceived costs of disease.
Findings on the effectiveness of priming, however, are inconclusive. Fram-
ing theory suggests that priming is less effective in promoting vaccination
than emphasizing the positive consequences of utilizing health services, pos-
tulating from prospect theory which states that the disutility from losses is
much more than the utility gain from the same amount of benefits (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979; Rothman and Salovey, 1997).6 7 On the other
hand, there are experimental studies that found priming the negative con-
sequence of non-vaccination was more persuasive for promoting vaccination
than priming the positive side of vaccination (Abhyankar et al., 2008; Gerend
and Sheperd, 2007), while some others found no comparative advantage of
6A method that emphasizes the salience of disease severity to promote vaccination
behavior can also fit into the idea of fear appeals, which intends to promote a particular
behavior by arousing fear (Witte and Allen, 2000). Similar to findings on the effectiveness
of framing, however, results on persuasiveness of fear appeals have not been consistent
(Dillard and Anderson 2004, Job 1988, Jepson and Chaiken 1990).
7Priming the negative consequence of vaccination can be less effective under the as-
sumption that vaccination behavior involves no risk. This is because prospect theory says
that people prefer taking risks when considering loss but avoid risk when considering gains
(Rothman et al., 1993). However, it is actually possible that people find vaccination risky,
if perceived vaccine safety and vaccine efficacy are the problem.
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the priming (O’Keefe and Nan, 2012; Nyhan et al., 2014). Thus I use im-
proved measures of actual vaccination take-up to causally study the effect of
priming of disease severity on vaccination.
Literature suggests that the priming about disease might affect the deci-
sion process, not only the overall decision to vaccinate, although the direc-
tion of the effect is ambiguous. If the increased perception of disease severity
makes one feel the need to eliminate the risk of contracting the disease, it
might hasten one’s vaccination timing. On the other hand, fear appeals
literature indicates that a fearful event has an adverse effect on informa-
tion processing that can lead to a delay in vaccination take-up (Jepson and
Chaiken 1990). We can think of the relationship between the fear and the
decision to vaccinate over time in the framework of anticipated dread; people
might behave according to the fear that they expect to perceive in the future.
Harris (2010) documented that people often choose to undergo unpleasant
events sooner rather than later, but the result can be reversed if such a fearful
event does not involve a monetary compensation (Myerson and Green 1995,
Rachlin et al., 1991). Thus, priming intervention might have delayed the
vaccine take-up without cash incentives, while it might have hastened their
vaccination decision once they were offered a higher amount of CCT.
1.2.2 Tetanus-toxoid Vaccine
I study tetanus-toxoid vaccines which are life-saving and free, but do not have
a high take-up rate. Nigeria is one of twenty five countries where tetanus
still is a major public health problem (WHO, 2013). Tetanus attributes to
high neonatal mortality rate, up to 20 percent in Nigeria (Oruamabo, 2007).
However, the take-up of tetanus vaccines remains low; 52.8 percent (DHS,
2013). Thus, this study focuses on tetanus-toxoid vaccine to evaluate how to
improve tetanus vaccination take-up.
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Fatality of neonatal tetanus reaches almost 100 percent without medical
treatment which is difficult to obtain in rural Africa (Blencowe et al, 2010).
In addition to high mortality, the typical symptom of tetanus is severe as
tetanus is extremely painful. Symptoms commonly include a series of muscle
spasms which accompanies severe pains.8 9
Tetanus-toxoid vaccine is the most effective way to prevent neonatal
tetanus. Because neonatal tetanus is typically contracted at the time of de-
livery when the umbilical cord is cut with a non-sterile instrument, hygienic
delivery also prevents tetanus incidence, in addition to the tetanus-toxoid
vaccine. However, providing tetanus-toxoid vaccines to mothers most effi-
ciently protects both mothers and newborn babies from tetanus. Providing
the tetanus-toxoid vaccination to mothers prevents neonatal tetanus with ef-
ficacy of over 80 percent with 5 years of protection if one follows the correct
vaccination schedule.
Although the actual benefit of the vaccination is high, the vaccination
take-up is low in Nigeria as compared to other countries. While the pro-
portion of newborn babies worldwide who were protected from the neonatal
tetanus is 82 percent (WHO, 2011), only 52.8 percent of the births were
fully protected from neonatal tetanus through tetanus toxoid vaccination to
mothers in Nigeria (DHS, 2013). In order to improve maternal and newborn
8Although tetanus toxoid vaccination can be accompanied with side effects like any
other vaccinations, symptoms are not severe in almost all cases (Middaugh, 1979). Com-
mon adverse responses to the tetanus toxoid vaccination include sore arm, swelling, and
itching which are considered mild.
9Following instructions for the vaccination to have a high impact is important. Ac-
cording to WHO, women at childbearing age and pregnant women are recommended to
receive multiple doses of tetanus toxoid vaccine. Receiving multiple doses prevents neona-
tal tetanus while take-up of the single dose is not sufficient to prevent neonatal tetanus
deaths; it can only prevent 43 percent of neonatal tetanus deaths (Ogunlesi, 2011). It is
also important to follow the vaccination schedule for the vaccination to be effective. First
dose should be taken at first contact or as soon as possible in pregnancy followed by second
dose at least four weeks after the first dose and third dose six months after the second
dose (WHO, 2006). My study, however, exclusively focuses on the single-dose take-up of
tetanus vaccination.
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babies’ health, the local government of Adamawa state in Nigeria, where I
conducted the study, has been providing free antenatal care service including
the tetanus toxoid vaccination to pregnant women. Despite this government
effort, the vaccination rate in the study area remains low: only 66.5 per-
cent of pregnant women were sufficiently vaccinated against tetanus. (DHS,
2013).
1.3 Experiment Design
In order to study the effect of various potential barriers on vaccination take-
up, I implemented a field experiment which randomized several factors. Par-
ticularly, I randomized three different factors; the amount of cash incentives,
the condition for cash incentives, and the type of disease message.
1.3.1 Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)
In order to measure the effect of monetary costs on vaccination, I randomly
varied the amount of conditional cash transfer (CCT) offered to each respon-
dent. The amount of money offered was randomly assigned to each respon-
dent: either 5 naira (approximately 3.3 US. cents), 300 naira (2 US. dollars)
or 800 naira (5.3 US. dollars). As a reference, the average daily earnings per
household was approximately 1,000 naira and that per person was 144 naira
in my study. The average transportation cost to the health clinic was about
250 naira both way among those who needs to pay for the transportation
while 50 percent of the sample did not pay for the transportation. Inter-
viewers randomly picked a questionnaire out of sets of questionnaires they
brought when they started a survey with each respondent. Each question-
naire has a page in the middle that indicates the amount of cash incentives
that the respondent are assigned to. I design the study so that each village
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has approximately the equal proportion of respondents who were offered each
amount of CCT.
1.3.2 Psychic Costs of Vaccination
In order to identify the psychic costs of vaccination, I randomly varied the
condition of CCT under which each respondent could receive the cash com-
pensation. The conditionality was either clinic attendance (Clinic CCT) or
clinic attendance and vaccination (Vaccine CCT). Respondents under Clinic
CCT could receive some amount of CCT if they visited an assigned clinic
regardless of the vaccination take-up, while respondents under Vaccine CCT
were entitled to some amount of money if they visited an assigned clinic and
received a tetanus toxoid vaccination at the clinic.
The difference in clinic attendance between respondents under Clinic CCT
and under Vaccine CCT reveals the influence of the psychic costs on vacci-
nation. This is because additional action is required under Vaccine CCT,
vaccination take-up upon clinic visit, in order to obtain the same amount
of cash compensation as Clinic CCT. The clinic visit by a respondent under
Clinic CCT indicates that she overcomes the monetary cost of clinic visit
such as transportation costs and opportunity cost at a certain amount of
cash incentive. On the other hand, the clinic visit by a respondent under
Vaccine CCT shows that the respondent overcomes the monetary costs of
clinic visit as well as the psychic costs of vaccination with the same amount
of money.
Thus if we find that the clinic attendance under Vaccine CCT is lower
than the one under Clinic CCT, we can say that the difference results from
the existence of net psychic costs. Although the Clinic CCT does not re-
quire respondents to receive vaccination, they have an option to receive the
tetanus vaccination if they wish to. However, this option would not affect
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the validation of the measurement of the psychic cost of vaccination.
1.3.3 Priming about Disease Severity
To measure the effect of the salient information about disease severity on vac-
cination take-up, I randomly varied the type of message about the severity
of tetanus: either the “scared straight”10 or the control message. The mes-
sage was conveyed to each respondent through a flipchart. I prepared two
different flipcharts: one with fearful pictures of tetanus patients (“scared
straight” flipchart) and another without such graphical information (control
flipchart). The “scared straight” flipchart had 15 slides and 7 slides out of
15 showed pictures of various tetanus patients to repeatedly emphasize the
severity of tetanus symptoms. The remaining 8 slides demonstrated symp-
toms of tetanus, severe pains and muscle spasms, with the written Hausa
language and introduced the effectiveness of the tetanus-toxoid vaccination.
The control flipchart had 8 slides with identical information as the “scared
straight” flipchart except that it does not have any pictures of tetanus pa-
tients.
The difference in the two types of flipcharts was to capture the effect of
priming about disease severity on vaccination behavior. In order to differ-
entiate only the salience of the message but not the information itself by
the flipchart, both flipcharts contained the identical verbal information on
tetanus and its vaccination. To capture the effect of priming, respondents
under the Vaccine CCT were shown the control flipchart to be compared
with another group of respondents who were offered cash incentives with
vaccination condition with the “scared straight” flipchart (Vaccine CCT &
10“Scared straight” originally refers to a program that intends to deter juveniles from
future crimes by showing them the life in prison (Petrosino et al., 2004). This is to
emphasize the severity of punishment, or the consequence of bad behaviors. I call a message
which emphasizes the disease severity as “scared straight” message because the purpose
of this message is to emphasize the consequence of non-vaccination, “bad behavior”.
14
Fear).
For the comparison between Clinic CCT and Vaccine CCT to be valid to
capture the psychic costs of vaccination, all respondents under both Clinic
CCT and Vaccine CCT received the control message. In order to measure
the effect of priming, I changed the type of the message only among re-
spondents who were offered the cash under vaccination condition (Vaccine
CCT and Vaccine CCT & Fear). Overall across villages, the study has an
equally-distributed sample size for each intervention; one third of the total
respondents received the Clinic CCT, one third received the Vaccine CCT,
and the last third received the Vaccine CCT & Fear.11
1.3.4 Intervention Process
In this section, I describe the experiment process. After the baseline interview
at each respondent’s house, the respondent was shown either the “scared
straight” or the control flipchart to inform about tetanus and tetanus-toxoid
vaccination. The intervention took place in a closed environment where there
was only an interviewer and a respondent at the moment of the intervention in
order to avoid an information spillover which is independent of respondents’
will.
At the end of the flipchart session, each respondent was told about the
cash compensation she could obtain and the criteria under which the respon-
dent was eligible to receive the compensation: clinic attendance or vaccina-
tion at the clinic. All the respondents were instructed to go to their assigned
health clinics within one week from the baseline interview with the voucher
(more detail discussed below) in order to be eligible CCT recipients. Respon-
dents were told that the health clinic were open from Monday to Saturday 8
11However, the distribution of sample under each intervention: Clinic CCT, Vaccine
CCT, and Vaccine CCT & Fear was different by village to measure the potential effect of
social network. But I do not discuss about this in this paper.
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am to 5 pm.
Finally, although uncertainty of vaccine supply is considered to be one
of the major barriers of vaccination, this study eliminates such a concern
because it ensured the sufficient vaccine supply by informing each respondent
that she was insured to receive the vaccination if she wished to.
1.4 Data
There are three pieces of data that I used to evaluate the experiment: base-
line data, post-intervention data, and data at health clinics. While the base-
line and post-intervention interviews took place at each respondent’s house,
health clinic interviews were carried out at health clinics only among respon-
dents who attended these clinics.
1.4.1 Setting
I conducted the study in Jada local government area, which exhibited the
lowest tetanus toxoid vaccination rate in Adamawa state, one of northeastern
state. Only 16.3 percent of women received tetanus toxoid vaccination during
their pregnancy and almost none of them received the vaccine before their
pregnancy in Jada local government (DHS, 2008).
This project was conducted in March of 2013 through May of 2013. It
involved 2,530 women from 80 villages. The sample was drawn from three-
stage sampling. First, 10 health clinics were selected in a way that they were
geographically spread across Jada local government. There was a total of 11
wards (9 rural wards and 2 urban wards) spanning all the villages in Jada
and the study exclusively focused on 9 rural wards with each ward having 1
to 5 public health clinics. I selected the main health clinic from each ward
with the exception of one large ward under which I selected 2 clinics, which
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made the total of 10 clinics for my study.
Second, I selected a total of 80 villages which fell within one of the catch-
ment areas of each clinic. Catchment areas of each health clinic were defined
by the primary healthcare development agency which was responsible for na-
tional immunization campaigns. All the villages within a catchment area of
each health clinic were selected if the village had more than 10 households
and the total number of villages in a clinic’s catchment did not exceed 15.
If it did, the priority was given to villages with the furthest distance to the
health clinic.
Third, one eligible woman, who was aged 15 to 35, was selected from
each household in each village. The survey team visited households in each
village to find out if there were any eligible women. A woman was ineligible
if she had received a tetanus vaccination in the 6 months prior to the time
of the survey in order to avoid overdose. This is because the second dose
of the tetanus vaccine should be given to individuals at least 6 months from
the first dose. In case where there was more than one eligible woman in
one household, the first priority was given to pregnant women who had not
received tetanus-toxoid vaccination in the past 6 months. If there were no
eligible pregnant woman in the household, then the second priority was given
to women who had never received tetanus vaccination before. If we still did
not find any eligible women with a priority, then women who did not receive
tetanus vaccine in the past 6 months were invited to participate in the survey.
If there were more than one woman who were eligible under the same priority,
then we randomly picked one of the eligible women by selecting the first one
in alphabetical order of the first name. On average, each health clinic covered
249 respondents from 9.6 villages in my study.12
12One thing to note here is that I did not conduct a census of each village. Thus,
the proportion of eligible women in each village was not designed to be fixed. However,
the survey team spent more time in larger villages, thus the eligible women should be
positively correlated with the size of village.
17
1.4.2 Baseline, Intervention, and Post-Intervention
A baseline questionnaire was administered to all respondents to capture the
prior knowledge, belief, and attitudes on tetanus and vaccination as well as
baseline characteristics including demography, health and economy of respon-
dents and their households. Finally the heart rate of each respondent was
measured using a heart rate monitor at the baseline survey. This measure
was to capture the emotional state of each respondent at the baseline level.
Immediately after the administration of the baseline questionnaire, the
intervention took place if respondents agreed to participate in the interven-
tion. After the flipchart session, respondents were provided a voucher which
could be redeemed at the assigned clinic and were asked to bring the voucher
with them to the clinic. The voucher indicated respondent’s name and her
unique ID that was assigned by the project, date of the intervention, name
of the health clinic to attend, type of the intervention (Clinic CCT or Vac-
cine CCT), and the amount of cash compensation to be provided. Any
redeemed voucher was matched to baseline data through the information on
the voucher. My analysis relies on this administrative data to examine the
clinic attendance.
After the intervention, a short questionnaire was administered to all the
respondents. It asked about respondents’ understanding level about tetanus
and its vaccine. If a respondent fully understood the contents explained in
flipchart, she would have been able to answer all the questions correctly as all
information asked in the questionnaire was provided during the intervention.
Respondents were also asked if the intervention caused emotional arouse as
well as changes in perceptions and beliefs about tetanus and tetanus tox-
oid vaccination. Questions in regard to knowledge, perceptions and beliefs in
this post-intervention questionnaire were identical to those asked in the base-
line survey to make them comparable. Comparable questions were used to
capture if the flipchart intervention triggered any changes in understanding,
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perceptions, and beliefs. The heart rate was measured immediately after the
intervention once again in the same way as in the baseline survey to measure
the emotional response to the flipchart.
1.4.3 Health Clinic
Health clinics were open for the duration of one week after the interven-
tion was carried out to each respondent whose households were within the
catchment area of each clinic. Upon attendance at an assigned clinic, all the
respondents were asked to form a line to wait to be served no matter which
intervention they received. This was to eliminate the difference in waiting
times by different treatment namely between Clinic CCT and Vaccine CCT
so that the vaccination take-up decision would not be affected by the differ-
ent waiting time. A brief questionnaire was administered to each attendee
when they were served. In the beginning of the questionnaire, the type of
the intervention each attendee received was confirmed through the voucher
she brought: either Clinic CCT or Vaccine CCT. If the conditionality was
“Vaccination”, she was provided the vaccination by the health staff right
then unless she refused it (although this case did not happen where a woman
under Vaccine CCT visited the clinic but refused the vaccination). Then,
the interviewer recorded that she received a vaccination in the survey. If the
conditionality was “Clinic Visit”, then the attendee was asked if she would
like to receive the vaccination. If she agreed, then the health staff gave her
the vaccination right then. Whereas if refused the vaccination, she simply
continued the questionnaire. Then this vaccination decision was recorded in
the survey. The process of receiving a vaccination did not waste anytime
because the interviewer was filling out the administrative information in the
questionnaire such as the date of the interview and copying the unique ID
from the voucher to the survey form while the health staff was giving her a
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vaccination right at the same place.
The questionnaire at health clinic recorded the data and time of the at-
tendee’s visit, means of transport from her house to the clinic, transportation
costs, and perceptions about tetanus toxoid vaccination. It also asked about
other services she came to utilize for, as well as other household members
she brought along if there was any. At the end of the interview, monetary
compensation was made with the exchange with the voucher.
1.4.4 Descriptive Statistics and Balancing Tests
Here I confirm the internal validity of the research design. I also describe
characteristics of respondents and show my sample is not so different from
national representative sample.
My analysis is based on 2,482 women aged 15 to 35 years old at the
time of baseline survey who did not receive tetanus-toxoid vaccination in the
past 6 months. Each of experimental treatment, Clinic CCT, Vaccine CCT,
and Vaccine CCT & Fear has a relatively equal proportion of respondents
who were offered each amount of CCT (Figure 1.4). Table 1.1 presents
the summary statistics of the full sample by experimental treatments. On
average respondents are 25 years old and just about half of the sample is
Muslim. Almost half of the women, 48.3 percent, did not receive any form of
education. Many respondents (43.5 percent) have paid work and the average
household earning per capita last month was 5,000 naira (approximately 33.3
US dollars). 15.3 percent has never been married and 76.5 percent had at
least one child. Around 18 percent of respondents were pregnant at the time
of baseline survey. Majority of respondents, 72.2 percent, have previously
visited the health clinic which was assigned to each respondent under this
study and the distance to the clinic was on average 1.7 kilometers. Overall,
39.8 percent of women have ever received tetanus-toxoid vaccination at least
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once. Around 18 percent of respondents believe that vaccines give HIV, while
more than 90 percent think that vaccines protect one from diseases. More
than 60 percent of respondents feel that needles of injections are scary and
vaccines have side effect. Around 25 percent of women think vaccines give
diseases.
Demographic characteristics are comparable to those of the representative
sample collected through Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (DHS,
2008). While Nigeria DHS sampled women aged 15 to 49, I restrict the DHS
sample to women aged 15 to 35 to compare with the data from my study
as the eligibility for my study is women aged 15 to 35. In the DHS sample,
over half of the women were Muslim (57.3 percent), about half of the sample
(49.6 percent) has never received any education and 62 percent of women
have a work at the time of baseline survey. These characteristics are very
similar to ones in my study. Only a small proportion of women in DHS
sample were single (2 percent) and majority (96.3 percent) has at least one
child. Fourteen percent was pregnant at the time of DHS survey and 31.8
percent has ever received the tetanus vaccination before. Overall, descriptive
statistics of most variables from DHS survey are statistically not different
from those from my study (Table not shown).
Randomization check in Table 1.1 (column 4 and 8) find very few dif-
ference between treatment groups. For all the demographic variables listed
above, I could not reject the equality of means between each treatment except
age. Age, on other hand, was found to be higher among respondents who
were offered the highest amount of cash incentives. I found some differences
in variables that captures concerns about vaccines, such as that needles are
scary and that vaccines have side effects, I control for these variables in all
my specifications.
21
1.5 Three Barriers to Vaccine Take-up
This section reports results about the effect of monetary costs, psychic costs,
and salient information about disease severity on vaccination take-up respec-
tively. Surprisingly, psychic costs are not the large barrier to vaccination,
contrary to a common belief. Priming about disease severity did not alter-
nate vaccination behavior, while it increased perceived severity of disease.
On the other hand, I found that cash incentives promoted vaccination to a
great extent.
Overall clinic attendance and vaccination take-up was very high. Figure
1.1 presents that 73.7 percent of women visited a clinic, while 72.6 percent
received the vaccination. This is very high as compared to baseline vaccina-
tion take-up, which was 39.8 percent. This high vaccination take-up might
be due to the information on tetanus and vaccination, which was provided
in some form to all respondents.
1.5.1 Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)
I examine the effect of cash incentives on vaccination take-up to see if they
can compensate for monetary costs of clinic visit. Using random variation of
the amount of cash incentives, I find a strong positive effect of cash incentives
on vaccination take-up. The effect of CCT was stronger among those with
higher monetary costs.
Specification
To identify if cash incentives increase vaccination take-up in a regression
framework, I estimate:
Yij = α + β1CCT300ij + β2CCT800ij +Xij
′µ+ ij (1.1)
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where Yij is the individual outcome: whether a woman i in village j re-
ceived a vaccination. CCT300(800) is a dummy variable which takes 1 if
the amount of the cash transfer was 300 (800) naira while its comparison
group is the lowest amount of cash transfer (CCT=5). The condition for
cash incentives (clinic attendance or vaccination) and the information type (
“scared straight” or “control” flipchart) was controlled for in this specifica-
tion. A vector of controls X includes individual-level covariates of age, age
squared, the highest education attained, marital status, religion (Muslim or
not), past tetanus-vaccination experience, whether the respondent has a paid
work, past utilization of the health clinic, distance to health clinic, whether
she has a child and village dummies. Standard errors are clustered by village,
for 80 villages.
Strong Effect of CCT
Vaccination take-up was highly responsive to financial incentives. The effect
of the medium CCT on vaccination take-up is 19.4 percentage points and the
effect of the highest CCT is 27.7 percentage points as compared to vaccination
take-up under the lowest amount of CCT (5 naira), 55.8 percent (Table 1.2
column 1).
This effect is very large, even compared to a similar program. The CCT
effect found in my study is comparable with the effect of an in-kind transfer
program in Banerjee et al. (2010): the conditional in-kind transfer (equiva-
lent to about $2.9 or around 435 naira in Nigerian currency) increased the
rate of full immunization by 21 percentage points in rural India, although
it did not increase one-time vaccination. In addition to the small in-kind
transfer, there were other factors in their study that were considered to at-
tribute to a very large treatment effect. First, the study area from Banerjee
et al. faced an extremely low vaccination rate before the intervention; the
baseline vaccination rate was only 6 percent, which made it easier for the in-
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tervention to have a larger effect. Also, respondents under their study faced
almost no transportation cost as the immunization camp was set inside the
village. Even without having such additional factors, CCT in my study had
a similar-sized effect to the program from Banerjee et al.
Because the monetary incentive was to compensate for the monetary costs
of visiting the clinic such as transportation costs and opportunity costs, I
look at the differential effect of CCT by transportation costs and total costs
of clinic visit.13 First, the relationship between the transportation costs
and clinic attendance is negative. Specifically, if the transportation costs
were positive and less than 200 naira, it reduced the attendance by 11.1
percentage points. Transportation costs between 200 naira and 300 naira
reduced the attendance by 11.8 percentage points (Table 1.2 column 2). A
similar relationship was observed between total costs (transportation costs
and opportunity costs) and clinic attendance.
The effect of CCT was stronger among respondents who have non-zero but
not-large transportation costs. Particularly, if the transportation costs were
positive but less than 200 naira, then the effect of the medium amount of CCT
(300 naira) was 10.1 percentage points larger than when the transportation
costs was zero. Similarly, the effect of 800 naira was 11.9 percentage points
larger if the transportation costs were positive but less than 200 naira (Table
1.2 column 2) and it was 12.5 percentage points larger if transportation costs
was between 200 naira and 300 naira. This implies that transportation costs
are one of barriers that obstructs one from attending the clinic, and CCT
compensates for transportation costs if they are not large. A similar but
stronger trend is observed for total costs of clinic visits.14
13Total costs of clinic visit were calculated as the summation of transportation costs and
opportunity costs. Opportunity costs are calculated based on the daily household income,
how much each respondent contributes to the household income, and the time it takes to
visit the clinic.
14On the other hand, I found that the effect of CCT was not affected by the distance
to the clinic. First, the relationship between the distance to the clinic and the clinic
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In addition to increasing the likelihood of attending the clinic, CCT also
changed the mode of transport. Table 1.3 presents that the higher amount of
CCT shifted the mode of transport to more expensive one. Among respon-
dents who attended the clinic, 800 naira reduced the likelihood of visiting the
clinic on foot by 3.6 percentage points, while it increased the likelihood of
going to clinic by motorcycle by 4.6 percentage points. It also increased the
transportation costs by 14.5 naira. It implies that even if people attend the
clinic, they are often constrained to visit the clinic with undesirable mode of
transport due to high costs of alternative mode.
1.5.2 Psychic Costs of Vaccination
This section examines if psychic costs reduce vaccination take-up. Contrary
to conventional wisdom from observational studies, I found that psychic costs
were not the main barriers to vaccination. My study emphasizes the impor-
tance of behavioral experiments to causally examine the existence of psychic
costs.
Specification
To identify if psychic costs of receiving a vaccination are barrier to vaccination
in a regression framework, I estimate:
Yij = α + β1V accineCCTij +Xij
′µ+ ij (1.2)
where Yij is the individual outcome: whether a woman i in village j
attended a clinic. V accineCCT=1 if the conditionality of cash transfer is
attendance was negative. The additional 1 kilometer from the health clinic reduced the
likelihood of clinic attendance by 5.3 percentage points (Table not shown). While I found
that the distance to clinic was a large barrier to attend the clinic, the effect of CCT on
clinic attendance was not different at any distance to the clinic. This result indicates that
cash incentives increase the clinic attendance in a same manner, regardless of the distance.
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vaccination as opposed to clinic attendance. Information type (either “scared
straight” or “control” flipchart) was controlled for in this specification. A
Standard errors are clustered by village, for 80 villages.
In order to measure psychic costs of vaccination at different amount of
CCT offered, I estimate:







δd(CCTdij × V accineCCTij) +Xij ′µ+ ij
(1.3)
I allow the differential effect of psychic costs at each amount of CCT
because the different types of respondents might attend clinics at the different
amount of CCT, and they might have different psychic costs of vaccination.
For example, more of respondents who decide to attend the clinic under Clinic
CCT with the lower amount of CCT might not have gone to clinic under
Vaccine CCT if psychic costs cannot be overcome with the small amount of
cash incentives. On the other hand, if one was offered the high amount of
CCT under Vaccine CCT, CCT might compensate for psychic costs to attend
the clinic, thus smaller difference in clinic attendance by the condition for
cash incentives.
Ruling out Psychic Costs as Barriers
Clinic Attendance
In order to measure the effect of psychic costs of receiving a vaccination such
as fear of needles or concern for the safety of vaccines, I examine if the rate
of clinic attendance was different between respondents under Clinic CCT
and under Vaccine CCT. Note that the attendance rate at the clinic and the
vaccination rate under the Vaccine CCT were identical, as all the respondents
who attended the clinic received the vaccine under the Vaccine CCT. This
is because there was no benefit from attending the clinic without receiving a
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vaccine, as they cannot get a cash transfer or the vaccine by simply attending
the clinic.
I find that the clinic attendance was not different between respondents
under different condition for cash incentives: Clinic CCT and Vaccine CCT
(Figure 1.2). Overall attendance at the clinic was 74.3 percent under the
Clinic CCT, while it was 74.8 percent under the Vaccine CCT. Table 1.4
(column 1) presents the effect of the vaccine condition on clinic attendance
as compared to clinic attendance condition. On average, the attendance
rate at health clinics under Vaccine CCT was not different from the one
under the Clinic CCT in terms of value as well as significance level. Thus, it
indicates that psychic costs are not the significant barriers that hinder one’s
vaccination. Although observational studies have emphasized psychic costs
as major barriers to vaccination, this result surprisingly revealed otherwise.
Table 1.4 (column 3) presents the differential effect of condition for cash
incentives on clinic attendance by the different amount of CCT. This is be-
cause women who choose to attend the clinic at each amount of cash incen-
tives might have different extent of psychic costs. However, I found that the
condition of cash incentives did not result in significant differences in clinic
attendance at any amount of CCT. Psychic costs of vaccination are not the
larger barrier for any women who could be influenced to attend the clinic
with 800 naira or less.15
In order to reassure that psychic costs are not the major barriers to vacci-
nation, I provide other possible interpretations of the same clinic attendance
under Clinic CCT and under Vaccine CCT that I will eliminate. The first
possibility is that respondents did not understand the clinic attendance con-
dition correctly and misunderstood that they had to receive the vaccine in
order to receive the cash compensation. In such a case, clinic attendance
15Because clinic attendance under 800 naira, CCT is 86.6 %, this paper does not address
if psychic costs of vaccination are large barriers among the remaining 13.4 % of respondents
who never showed up at the clinic.
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would be identical under the two conditions. However, this scenario was less
likely because this would not have happened unless all the respondents under
the Clinic CCT misunderstood the condition for cash incentives.
I further show two pieces of evidence that suggest respondents under-
stood the conditionality. First, the proportion of respondents who rejected
the vaccine was higher on the first day of the project in each village than
on successive days; the rejection rate on the first day in each village was, on
average, 2.8 percent while the rate on successive days was 0.8 percent. If
respondents did not understand the condition under Clinic CCT and they
misunderstood that they were required to receive a vaccine in order to ob-
tain cash incentives, the rejection rate on the first day should have been
lower than that on successive days and it would have got higher overtime as
respondents learned the conditionality correctly and refused the vaccination
under Clinic CCT. Second, it is unlikely that all the respondents misunder-
stood the conditionality because each interviewer was trained carefully, with
particular attention to the importance of clearly explaining the conditional-
ity to respondents. Table A1.1 confirms that each interviewer had at least
one respondent who rejected vaccination under the Clinic CCT. It indicates
that respondents generally understood the clinic conditionality, which each
interviewer explained. Thus, it is unlikely that respondents under Clinic
CCT misunderstood the conditionality, although there is no direct evidence
to prove it.
The second possibility is that respondents did not differentiate psychic
costs of vaccine from psychic costs of clinic attendance. It is possible that a
respondent did not trust health services, including vaccinations. However, I
claim that this possibility is less likely because respondents under the “Clinic
Visit” conditionality did not have to use any services at the health clinic, nor
did they have to interact with the health staff. Non-health workers were
hired to interact with respondents at each health clinic who attended the
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clinic. Health workers interacted with respondents only when they accepted
to receive a vaccination.
In order to illustrate that the high correlation between psychic costs of
clinic visits and psychic costs of vaccination could lead to the same clinic
attendance rate between Clinic CCT and Vaccine CCT, I introduce a simple
model of clinic attendance. Assume that net benefits of attending a clinic but
not receiving a vaccine is Bh under Vaccine CCT where Bh is net psychic
benefits of clinic visit, while it is Bh + τ under Clinic CCT where τ is
cash incentives. Net benefits of attending a clinic and receiving a vaccine
is Bh + τ + Bv under both Clinic CCT and Vaccine CCT, where Bv is the
net psychic benefits of vaccination. I further assume that net benefits of not
attending a clinic is zero. Then, a respondent decides to attend the clinic
and receive a vaccine if
UnderClinicCCT : Bh + τ +Bv > 0 and Bh + τ +Bv > Bh + τ
UnderV accineCCT : Bh + τ +Bv > 0 and Bh + τ +Bv > Bh
(1.4)
While she will attend the clinic without receiving a vaccine if
UnderClinicCCT : Bh + τ > 0 and Bh + τ > Bh + τ +Bv
UnderV accineCCT : Bh > 0 and Bh > Bh + τ +Bv
(1.5)
Figure 1.3 draws a simple graph to show how psychic costs of clinic at-
tendance and psychic costs of vaccination interact to affect the decision to
attend the clinic and receive a vaccine. The shaded area in blue captures
respondents who go to clinic under Clinic CCT but do not go under Vaccine
CCT. The shaded area in green represents respondents who receive a vaccine
under Vaccine CCT but reject a vaccine under Clinic CCT at the clinic. Be-
cause the amount of CCT varies from very low (5 naira) to relatively high
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(800 naira), the proportion of respondents who are in the shaded areas would
be different by the amount of CCT. Namely, if people are distributed equally
across the space, more respondents with higher psychic costs of health clinic
will accept to visit the clinic without vaccination under Clinic CCT as the
amount of cash incentives increase, while less people go to clinic without
vaccination under Vaccine CCT.
Here I examine the possible distribution of respondents. Because I found
that the clinic attendance was not different by the condition for cash incen-
tives at any amount of CCT offered although the higher amount of CCT
attracted more respondents for clinic attendance, respondents should be ei-
ther above of shaded area in blue, or at the right of shaded areas (Figure
1.3). However, the distribution should not be above blue-shaded area because
the refusal rate of vaccination at the clinic was the same by the condition
for cash incentives at any amount of CCT, which should have been differ-
ent if respondents spread across the green-shaded area (Table 1.4 column 5).
Thus, respondents are at the right of shaded area in blue and the distribu-
tion is spread across −τ slope line. From this analysis, it should be the case
that psychic costs of vaccination among respondents are low, Bh and Bv are
positively correlated, or both.
Overall, I find no evidence that psychic costs are the large barriers to
vaccine take-up. However, it is important to note that this study does not
address psychic costs among those who never attended the clinic even at the
highest amount of CCT offered (less than 15 percent of the total sample).
Nonetheless, this result is surprising because it is contrary to the conventional
wisdom from observational studies that states that psychic costs obstruct
people from getting vaccinated to a great extent.
Vaccination take-up
In addition to clinic attendance, I also examined the difference in vaccination
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take-up and found that almost all respondents who attended the clinic under
Clinic CCT decided to receive a vaccine, although receiving a vaccine was
not necessary for them to get cash incentives. This reassures that psychic
costs are not the large barriers to vaccination.
Among 825 respondents who were offered any amount of cash incentives
under the Clinic CCT which did not require vaccination, there were only
26 women who refused to receive the vaccine upon their attendance at the
assigned health clinic. In other words, 95.7 percent of women received vac-
cination although vaccination was not required for cash rewards. Table 1.4
(column 2) shows that the difference in vaccination take-up between two
conditions is merely 3.4 percentage points. This result reinforces the fact
that the psychic cost of vaccination was not significant, because they did not
need additional incentives to receive a vaccine once they attended the clinic.
Although women may have psychic costs at clinic, it was only to a very small
extent.
Here, I provide possible reasons why the vaccination rate is different by
the condition for cash incentives. One possible reason to reject the vaccine
under Clinic CCT but not under Vaccine CCT is psychic costs of vaccination,
which is the focus of this study. Another possibility is the low perceived
benefit of vaccination. If an individual is indifferent between receiving a
vaccine and not receiving a vaccine, then she may choose not to receive
it. This can make a difference in vaccination take-up under two conditions,
Clinic CCT and Vaccine CCT, because women under Clinic CCT might not
receive the vaccination because they can receive the money even without
vaccination, while women would receive the vaccination under the Vaccine
CCT as it is a necessary condition to receive the cash compensation. Thus,
the vaccination take-up is expected to be lower under the Clinic CCT than
under the Vaccine CCT due to psychic costs of vaccination as well as the low
perceived benefit of vaccination.
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Third possibility for why the vaccination rate might have been different
under the two conditions is selection. It is possible that women with differ-
ent characteristics self-select to attend the clinic under the Clinic CCT and
under the Vaccine CCT, which might lead to the difference in vaccination ac-
ceptance. Table A1.2 presents the difference in characteristics among women
who attended the clinic under each condition for cash incentives. Charac-
teristics listed in the table had no differences between two conditions. The
self-selection into clinic attendance is less likely to cause the difference in
vaccination take-up. Finally, it is possible for respondents to refuse vaccina-
tion if it takes time to receive one. However, the marginal (physical) cost
of receiving a vaccination at the clinic in this study setting was almost zero
because the additional time required for receiving the vaccine was only a
minute or two, and respondents who wished to receive the vaccine did not
have any additional processes to go through as compared to those who did
not want the vaccine.
Descriptive studies can be deceiving, because the finding from my ran-
domized experiment contradicts with the observation from the descriptive
study. In addition to the experiment to derive the psychic costs of vacci-
nation, I collected data on reasons of non-vaccination among those who had
never received a vaccine prior to the study, as well as reasons why respondents
had never taken their children for vaccination if they had not previously done
so (Table A1.3). While the largest proportion of respondents listed lack of
awareness as a main reason of non-vaccination for themselves (36.9 %), psy-
chic costs such as fear of side effects and fear of injection were the second main
reason (17.4 %). Similarly, psychic costs were the main reason for children’s
non-vaccination together with supply-side problems, such as insufficient sup-
ply of vaccines. Unlike the results from this experiment, these figures can
mislead us to conclude that psychic costs of vaccination are the main barri-
ers to vaccination. However, my experiment reveals that these costs do not
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obstruct one from vaccination even if they might exist. My study highlights
the importance of behavioral experiments to causally identify the effect of
psychic costs on vaccine take-up.
Overall, results exhibit that women do not face large psychic costs of
receiving a vaccination. Although they may have such costs especially at
the health clinic, these psychic costs are observed to be very small or easy
to overcome with the small amount of cash incentives. Psychic costs of
vaccination do not seem to be the major problem that prevents women from
vaccination.
1.5.3 Priming about Disease Severity
This section examines the effect of priming about disease severity on vacci-
nation take-up. Although the previous section found that psychic costs are
not the main barriers to vaccination, the priming intervention potentially
influences the broader population by emphasizing the importance of vaccines
through increasing perceived costs of disease. I found that priming increased
the perceived severity of disease, but it did not increase the vaccination take-
up.
Specification
To identify if priming about disease severity increases vaccination in a re-
gression framework, I estimate:
Yij = α + β1V accineCCT&Fearij +Xij
′µ+ ij (1.6)
where Yij is the individual outcome: whether a woman i in village j re-
ceived a vaccination. V accineCCT&Fear=1 if a respondent i was shown
the “scared straight” flipchart, as compared to control flipchart. The condi-
tion for cash incentives (Clinic CCT or Vaccine CCT) was controlled for in
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this specification. All the respondents under “scared straight” flipchart were
offered cash incentives under Vaccine CCT. Standard errors are clustered by
village, for 80 villages.
Similar to the previous section, I also measure the differential effect of
priming by the amount of CCT offered:







φd(CCTdij × V accineCCT&Fearij) +Xij ′µ+ ij
(1.7)
This is to examine if there is a complementarity or substitution effect
between cash incentives and priming intervention.
No Priming Effect on Behavior
Vaccination take-up
Priming did not increase vaccination. The priming about disease severity
rather reduced vaccination take-up by 2.5 percentage points, but the effect
was statistically insignificant (Table 1.5 column 1). Similarly, the interaction
terms between priming intervention and any amount of CCT are insignificant
(Table 1.5 column 3). This suggests that the priming intervention was not
effective in promoting vaccination at any amount of cash incentives offered.
Although priming did not induce vaccination behavior, it altered the per-
ceived severity of disease. Table 1.6 shows that if a respondent was shown a
“scared straight’ flipchart, they were likely to believe that 2.53 more people
would die from tetanus out of a hypothetical 100 people than respondents
who were shown a control flipchart would. “Scared straight” flipcharts also
increased the probability that a respondent felt very worried about tetanus,
felt that tetanus was very bad, and felt that it was very important to be
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protected from tetanus more than control flipcharts did by 14.3, 13.8, and
10.4 percentage points. I also found that women who were shown the “scared
straight’ flipchart were more likely to feel frightened, tense, nervous, and un-
comfortable than those who were shown the control flipcharts (Table A1.4).
This is the evidence that priming was salient enough to induce an increase
in net perceived benefits of vaccination.
Using objective measures of emotional response to the priming interven-
tion, I also found that “scared straight’ flipcharts induced the emotional
response. Priming increased heart rate by 6.27 beats per minute more than
control flipcharts did (Table 1.6 column 7). This proves that the priming
intervention influenced respondents’ emotion, although it did not change the
behavior.
There are several possible reasons why priming failed to change vaccina-
tion behavior even though it increased the perceived severity of tetanus. One
possibility is that the “scared straight” message increased perceived costs of
disease only among respondents who would have received a vaccine even
without the “scared straight” message. However, this possibility is less likely
because I found that the “scared straight” message increased perceived dis-
ease severity especially among women who had low perceived costs of disease
at the baseline, and the perceived costs of disease were positively correlated
with the likelihood of receiving a vaccine (Table not shown). Second pos-
sibility is that respondents already had a high level of perceived severity of
tetanus before the intervention, and lack of the perceived severity of disease
was not the binding constraint on receiving a vaccination.
Third possibility is the time effect of the intervention. For example,
it is possible that the intervention only had a temporal effect on the risk
perception but such an effect vanished quickly over time so that it did not
affect vaccination behavior. It is also possible that the interval from the
time each respondent received the priming intervention to the time when she
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had to decide if she wanted the vaccine was too short to affect the actual
vaccination. However, this study is not able to directly test these possibilities.
Overall, results indicated that priming about disease severity increased
the perceived severity of tetanus, but it did not enhance vaccination take-up
at least in the short-term.
Timing of Clinic Visit
This section examines how priming about disease severity affected the timing
of clinic visit. Timing is an important variable to analyze because it could
potentially affect the decision process for receiving a vaccination, although
it did not change the overall decision to vaccinate. I examine if priming
hastened or delayed the respondents’ visit to the clinic through increasing
the perceived severity of disease.
In order to examine the timing of clinic attendance, I estimate the Cox
proportional hazard model:
γc(t|zi(t)) = γ0(t)exp(zi(t)′β) (1.8)
where γc(t|zi(t)) is the individual hazard rate, γ0(t) is the baseline hazard
rate, t is the time when a respondent i attended a clinic, and zi(t) is the set
of individual variables.
“Scared straight’ flipcharts neither hastened nor delayed women’s atten-
dance at clinic on average with or without cash incentives (Table 1.5 column
2 and 4). The likelihood of a respondent to attend a health clinic by a par-
ticular time was the same between both groups: Vaccine CCT and Vaccine
CCT & Fear. This result is consistent with the effect of the priming on vac-
cine take-up. The intervention had no effect on behavioral change, both on
the decision as well as on the process through which one reached the decision.
Although priming did not change the timing of clinic attendance among
the total sample, it did affect the timing among those who attended the
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clinic (Table 1.5 column 5).16 Under the lowest amount of cash incentives,
“scared straight” message delayed one’s clinic visit by 27 percentage points
while higher amount of CCT compensated for the delay of clinic visit. If the
priming intervention was associated with the medium or the highest amount
of CCT, then the timing of one’s clinic visit was no longer different from one
under control message. Rather, the combination of the highest cash incen-
tives and priming intervention hastened one’s visit, although cash incentives
without priming rather delayed the visit. This result is consistent with find-
ings from some of previous studies (Myerson and Green, 1995; Rachlin et al.,
1991).
1.5.4 Sub-group Analysis
In this section, I analyze the differential effect of psychic costs and of priming
effect by the type of respondents. Specifically, I focus on the respondent’s
experience with tetanus-toxoid vaccination and pregnancy status. Past vac-
cination behaviors and the current pregnancy status might form specific per-
ceptions of benefits and costs of vaccination which could then affect attitudes
toward vaccination. I found that among women without previous experience
of tetanus vaccination, psychic costs were larger at the clinic and the prim-
ing backfired on their vaccination behavior due to low perceived severity of
disease and low efficacy of vaccine.
Past Tetanus Vaccination Take-up
Psychic costs of vaccination might differ by types of people, and the past
vaccination decision might have reflected the psychic costs. For example, if
one has never received tetanus-toxoid vaccination before (non-experienced),
16Remember that among women whose condition for cash incentives was vacination,
none refused vaccination once they attended the clinic. Thus, I treat “the timing of clinic
attendance” in the same way as “the timing of vaccination”.
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this might be due to the high psychic costs of receiving a vaccination. On
the other hand, these psychic costs might not be barriers for those who
received vaccination but never completed the vaccination series (one-time
experienced).
I found that while one-time experienced women did not face psychic costs
(Table A1.5 column 2 and 5), non-experienced women had a stronger psychic
costs of receiving a vaccination than average women at the clinic (Table A1.5
column 1 and 4). Although the clinic attendance was the same under the
different condition for cash incentives (Clinic CCT and Vaccine CCT) both
among non-experienced and among one-time experienced, vaccination rate
was lower under Clinic CCT among non-experienced women by 5.5 percent-
age points. I confirmed that this difference in vaccination take-up among
non-experienced is not due to the difference in characteristics among women
who attended the clinic (Table A1.6). On the other hand, there was no dif-
ference in vaccination take-up by the condition for cash incentives among
one-time experienced women.
It is important to examine the effect of interventions on vaccination take-
up especially among non-experienced women because they are the priority
in the policy. The effect of CCT was the same for all the women regardless
of the past experience of tetanus vaccination (Table not shown). On the
other hand, I found that the effect of priming on vaccination among non-
experienced women was negative; priming about disease severity reduced
vaccination by 3.9 percentage points (Table A1.5 column 4) even though
it increased the perceived severity of tetanus (Table A1.7 panel A). Fear
appeals literature suggests that fear appeals can have an adverse effect if the
perception of risk of contracting the disease and perceived vaccine efficacy
that respondents face is low (Caplin, 2003). In fact, Table A1.8 presents
evidence that the non-experienced women were actually less likely to believe
that they were at the risk of contracting tetanus.
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Pregnancy
Since this study emphasized the importance of vaccinations for pregnant
women, pregnant women may have had different response to interventions
from other women. However, I did not find any differential effect of interven-
tions for pregnant women. I found that psychic costs of vaccination among
pregnant women was not the large barrier and that the priming effect was not
effective in promoting vaccination behavior. (Table A1.5 column 3 and 6).
The priming intervention did not increase the perceived severity of tetanus
much (Table A1.7 panel C). This might be because the pregnancy already
made the women sufficiently cautious about any disease risk that could affect
the baby.
1.6 Conclusion
This study uses a field experiment in rural northern Nigeria to examine the
relative importance of various potential barriers to vaccine take-up by eval-
uating the causal effect of monetary costs, psychic costs, and priming about
disease severity. I find that psychic costs of vaccination are not the major
barriers to vaccination contrary to conventional wisdom. Cash incentives
increase vaccination take-up significantly by relaxing the monetary costs of
clinic visits such as transportation costs. Priming about disease severity
does not increase vaccination take-up but it increases perceived costs of the
disease.
My paper contributes to a better understanding of the barriers to vac-
cination, particularly by examining the causal effect of psychic costs which
have been considered as a major barrier without a causal examination. I
highlighted the importance of behavioral experiment to study psychic costs
because my experimental design reveals no such costs, which is contradictory
to what observational studies have claimed.
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I also contribute to literature of other channels of vaccination behaviors.
First, I contribute to the literature on CCTs because my study accurately
measures the effect of CCT with a single conditionality and finds a strong
influence on vaccination take-up, while previous studies only used CCT with
multiple conditionalities and found a weak result on vaccination take-up.
Second, I contribute to priming literature because I used improved measures
of outcome variables to examine priming effect in Africa for the first time:
actual vaccination take-up as well as the objective measure of perceptions,
heart rate.
Although this study produced new insights on vaccination behavior, there
are limitations in my study. First, this study does not address the psychic
costs among those who did not attend the clinic even when they were offered
the highest amount of cash incentives. They might be the ones who have
larger psychic costs of vaccination. Second, this paper does not generalize
the findings on vaccination behavior by other groups of people such as males,
children and elders, because the sample is restricted to women of childbearing
age or pregnant women. Third, the study only looked at the effect of inter-
vention on one-time vaccination take-up. Tetanus-toxoid vaccines as well as
other recommended vaccines such as OPV and DPT are required to be taken
multiple times to have the sufficient protective effect. However, this study
did not examine the persistent effect of intervention on take-up of multiple
doses.
Further studies need to assess the potential larger psychic costs among
women who did not attend the clinic even at the high cash incentives. One
way to address this is to offer vaccinations at each household of the respon-
dent. This can eliminate the possible correlation between psychic costs of
vaccination and psychic costs of clinic visits to accurately identify psychic
costs of vaccination among general population. Additionally, the future re-
search needs to be done in order to identify what type of information, such
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as the information on vaccine availability and on vaccination schedule, is
effective in increasing vaccine take-up.
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Notes: Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a
missing value on GPS coordinates). 150 naira = $1 approximately. C is clinic attendance rate, and V is vaccination take-up.












Clinic CCT Vaccine CCT Vaccine CCT & Fear
Attended Clinic Received Vaccination
Notes: Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a 
missing value on GPS coordinates). Figure presents the rate of clinic attendance and vaccination at the clinic.  










M under Clinic CCT, 







Notes: In the area with L, women do not attend clinic. Women attend clinic but refuse a vaccine under M, and women attend clinic and 
receive a vaccine under N. 𝐵𝑣 is the net psychic benefits of vaccination and 𝐵ℎ is the net psychic benefits of clinic visit.  
Figure 1.3: Model of Psychic Costs of Vaccination
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2,482 Women














































Notes: Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a
missing value on GPS coordinates). 150 naira = $1 approximately. N is the number of observations.
Figure 1.4: Research Design (Number of Observation)
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Panel A: Sample Size by Treatment
Clinic CCT 822
Vaccine CCT 878

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Demographics:
Age 24.822 25.279 25.216 0.257 24.867 24.915 25.510 0.056
Muslim 0.494 0.484 0.510 0.564 0.478 0.525 0.482 0.110
Highest education = no education 0.483 0.489 0.477 0.894 0.507 0.469 0.475 0.268
Has paid work 0.423 0.442 0.440 0.705 0.424 0.452 0.429 0.471
Monthly household earning per capita (naira) 5929.064 5640.343 6083.256 0.529 5430.287 6097.71 6068.16 0.193
Marital status = Single 0.157 0.150 0.151 0.918 0.154 0.155 0.149 0.923
Currently pregnant 0.180 0.165 0.202 0.147 0.166 0.179 0.198 0.253
Have children 0.758 0.788 0.746 0.106 0.763 0.761 0.769 0.919
Ever used clinic 0.700 0.724 0.744 0.134 0.714 0.741 0.712 0.320
Distance to clinic (km) 1.717 1.697 1.712 0.943 1.721 1.675 1.730 0.621
Transport to clinic (naira) 120.125 129.118 121.004 0.593 122.648 113.676 134.059 0.107
Opportunity costs to clinic (naira) 3.913 4.028 4.278 0.661 4.350 3.765 4.116 0.849
Received tetanus vaccine before 0.384 0.410 0.400 0.556 0.401 0.394 0.400 0.949
Beliefs:
Vaccines give HIV 0.187 0.186 0.178 0.867 0.205 0.181 0.167 0.138
Vaccines protect from disease 0.911 0.911 0.914 0.955 0.908 0.914 0.913 0.910
Needles are scary 0.589 0.641 0.616 0.049 0.634 0.604 0.612 0.438
Vaccines have side effects 0.652 0.692 0.634 0.028 0.678 0.662 0.644 0.331
Vaccines give diseases 0.253 0.288 0.270 0.237 0.281 0.268 0.264 0.730
Table 1.1: Balancing and Summary Statistics
Amount of CCTCondition of CCT and message
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with GPS coordinates  (8 have a missing value
on GPS coordinates). 35 out of the total sample are dropped from the neighbor-level variables because they have no neighbors within 100 meters.
150 naira = $1 approximately. Sample mean is reported in columns 1-3 and 5-7, while columns 4 and 8 report p-value for the test of equality














CCT300 * Transport 1 0.101**
(0.049)
CCT300 * Transport 2 0.067
(0.058)
CCT300 * Transport 3 -0.046
(0.063)
CCT800 * Transport 1 0.119**
(0.052)
CCT800 * Transport 2 0.125*
(0.071)




Mean of Dependent Variable 0.558 0.615
Covariates X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X
Table 1.2: Effect of CCT and Transpirtation Costs
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household
location is recorded with GPS coordinates. Missing observations are due to missing
values in GPS coordinates and transportation costs. Transport is the transportation
costs which are the total costs respondents claimed required to visit the clinic (both
way). Transport 0= 0 transportation cost, Transport 1= 0-200 naira of transportation
costs, Transpot 2=200-300 naira of transporation costs, and Transport 3=300 naira
or more of transporation costs. Control group is the group of women under CCT=5.
Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. Covariates
include age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine
before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic
only in (1). Mean of Dependent Variable is the mean under CCT in (1), and under
CCT and transportation costs=0 under (2). * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%
Received vaccine
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CCT=300 -0.024 0.004 0.030 0.001 -0.892 9.605*
(0.022) (0.003) (0.023) (0.007) (2.013) (5.524)
CCT=800 -0.036* 0.008* 0.046* -0.006 -0.319 14.463**
(0.021) (0.004) (0.023) (0.006) (2.123) (6.275)
Walk at baseline 0.033
(0.023)
Bicycle at baseline -0.014
(0.010)
Morocycle at baseline 0.038*
(0.020)
Car at baseline 0.035**
(0.016)
Observations 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1775
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.008
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.815 0.000 0.169 0.014 43.199 33.005
Covariates X X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X X X
Table 1.3: Effect of CCT on Mode of Transport (Endline)
Notes:  Sample used here is the sample of 1,829 women who attended the clinic and whose household
location is recorded with GPS coordinates. MIssing observations are due to missing values in
transporation costs in (6).  Control group is the group of women under CCT=5. Robust standard
errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. Control group is the group of women under
CCT=5. Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. Covariates include
age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if
ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic. Mean of Dependent Variable is the mean under
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vaccine CCT 0.002 0.034* -0.011 0.021 0.058**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.032) (0.036) (0.025)
CCT=300 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.021
(0.039) (0.041) (0.026)
CCT=800 0.284*** 0.282*** 0.024
(0.038) (0.039) (0.021)
CCT=300 * (Vaccine CCT) 0.047 0.044 -0.019
(0.042) (0.046) (0.026)
CCT=800 * (Vaccine CCT) -0.000 0.001 -0.024
(0.038) (0.041) (0.022)
Observations 2482 2482 2482 2482 1829
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.113 0.110 0.040
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.743 0.712 0.563 0.531 0.942
Covariates X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X X
p-values of F test:
(Vaccine CCT + CCT=300 * Vaccine CCT) = 0 0.160 0.015 0.003
(Vaccine CCT + CCT=800 * Vaccine CCT) = 0 0.652 0.462 0.015
Table 1.4: Psychic Costs of Vaccination
Notes:  Sample used in (1) to (4) is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is
recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates) and column (5)
used 1,829 women who attended the clinic. Control group is the group of women under Clinic
CCT and under CCT=5. Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented.
Control group is the group of women under CCT=5. Robust standard errors clustered by villages
(80 villages) are presented. Covariates include age, education level, marital status, religion, if
received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to
the clinic. The minimum detective effect size (standardized) of VaccineCCT is 0.1 with
significance level 0.9 and with power of 0.8. Because the standard deviation of the outcome
variable (Received Vaccine) is 0.45, the minimum detective effect size (unstandardized) is 0.045
and the effect below can be considered economically insiginificant. Mean of Dependent Variable
is mean under Clinic CCT for (1) and (2),  and under Clinic CCT and CCT5 for (3) to (5). *














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vaccine CCT & Fear -0.025 -0.027 -0.010 -0.114 -0.270**
(0.018) (0.059) (0.033) (0.110) (0.122)
CCT=300 0.215*** 0.528*** -0.124
(0.030) (0.095) (0.084)
CCT=800 0.282*** 0.703*** -0.191**
(0.035) (0.097) (0.079)
CCT=300 * (Vaccine CCT & Fear) -0.023 0.100 0.359**
(0.043) (0.140) (0.164)
CCT=800 * (Vaccine CCT & Fear) -0.017 0.172 0.460***
(0.043) (0.124) (0.170)
Observations 2482 2458 2482 2458 1806
R-squared 0.022 0.110
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.748 0.748 0.575 0.575 1.000
Covariates X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X X
p-values of F test:
(Vaccine CCT & Fear + CCT=300 * Vaccine CCT & Fear) = 0 0.244 0.879 0.263
(Vaccine CCT & Fear + CCT=800 * Vaccine CCT & Fear) = 0 0.340 0.476 0.033
Table 1.5: Effect of  Message Priming about Disease Severity
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with
GPS coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates) in (1) to (4). 24 out of the total sample are
dropped from the hazard model because the time of clinic attandance was missing. The sample in (5) is
1,806 women who attended the clinic and has the information of the time of clinic attendance. Control
group is the group of women under Vaccine CCT and under CCT=5. Robust standard errors clustered by
villages (80 villages) are presented. Covariates include age, education level, marital status, religion, if
received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic.
The minimum detective effect size (standardized) of VaccineCCT is 0.1 with significance level 0.9 and
with power of 0.8. Because the standard deviation of the outcome variable (Received Vaccine) is 0.45, the
minimum detective effect size (unstandardized) is 0.045 and the effect below can be considered
economically insiginificant. Mean of Dependent Variable is the mean under Vaccine CCT in (1) and (2)

































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Vaccine CCT & Fear 0.015 2.529** 0.143***0.138*** 0.104*** -0.935 6.270***
(0.018) (1.175) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (1.351) (0.701)
Observations 2283 2280 2283 2283 2283 2278 2091
R-squared 0.094 0.090 0.147 0.111 0.119 0.111 0.404
Mean of Dependent 0.459 37.414 0.566 0.649 0.746 43.572 87.735
Covariates X X X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X X X X
Table 1.6: Did Messaging Change Perception of Tetanus? (Endline)
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with GPS
coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates). Missing obeservations in each specification is due to
missing values and invalid numbers. Control group is the group of women under Vaccine CCT and under
CCT=5. Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. All the dependent variables
indicate the measurement after the flipcharts intervention. "Likely to get tetanus" is a binary variable which
takes 1 if a respondent answers as " high likelihood" to the question "what is the likelihood that you get
tetanus?" "Number of people who die of tetanus" is the number of people out of 100 a respondent provided to a
question "Once they have tetanus, how many people do you think would die because of Tetanus?". "Very
worried about tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 if a respondent answers "very worried" to the question
"How worried are you that you might get tetanus? Very worried, worried, not too worried, not worried at all?".
"Tetanus is very bad" is a binary variable which takes 1 is a respondent answers "very bad" to the question "How
bad would it be if you get tetanus? Very bad, bad, not too bad, not bad at all?". "Very important to be protected
from tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 is a respondent answers "very important" to the question "How
important is it for you to make sure that you are protected from tetanus? Very important, important, not too
important, not important at all?" "Vaccine Efficacy" is the difference between hypothetical number of
unvaccinated people whom each respondent thinks get tetanus and number of vaccinated people who get tetanus.
"Heart rate" indicates the heart rate of a respondent measured. Covariates include age, education level, marital
status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance
to the clinic, and baseline attitudes such as likelihood of contracting tetanus, number of people the respondent
thinks die out of tetanus, if the respondent is very worried about tetanus, if the respondent thinks tetanus is very
bad, subjective vaccine efficacy and heart rate. Mean of Dependent Variable is mean under Vaccine CCT. *






A 5 66 71
B 1 66 67
C 3 57 60
D 4 73 77
E 2 53 55
F 2 49 51
G 2 55 57
H 1 55 56
I 2 53 55
J 4 58 62
Total 26 585 611
Table A1.1: Did Respondents Understand Clinic Conditionality?
Number of respondents who:
Notes:  Sample used here is 611 respondents who visited the clinic under Clinic CCT.
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Sample: Clinic CCT Vaccine CCT Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Age 25.200 25.498 -0.298 (0.341)
Muslim 0.466 0.452 0.014 (0.028)
Highest education = no education 0.456 0.464 -0.008 (0.028)
Has paid work 0.447 0.463 -0.016 (0.028)
Monthly household earning per capita (naira) 5920.8 5603.1 317.7 (435.5)
Marital status = Single 0.163 0.152 0.011 (0.020)
Currently pregnant 0.183 0.164 0.019 (0.023)
Have children 0.771 0.796 -0.025 (0.023)
Ever used clinic 0.687 0.726 -0.039 (0.026)
Distance to clinic (km) 1.598 1.569 0.029 (0.066)
Transport to clinic (naira) 115.79 116.70 -0.907 (11.03)
Opportunity costs to clinic (naira) 22.094 19.288 2.807 (2.383)
Received tetanus vaccine before 0.387 0.387 -0.000 (0.027)
Notes:  Sample used here is 1,268 women who visited an assigned clinic under Clinic CCT or under
Vaccine CCT. Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.






children have not received
any vaccination
(1) (2)
Lack of information 0.369 0.120
Psychic costs of vaccination 0.174 0.180
Post too far 0.169 0.150
Supply-side problem 0.046 0.180
Not enough money 0.031 0.077
Misconception of vaccination 0.021 0.120
No particular reason 0.169 0.133
Other 0.021 0.030
Table A1.3: Reasons for Non Vaccination
Notes:  Sample used here 195 women who have never received vaccination for herself in (1),
and 233 women who have never taken children for vaccination in (2). Psychic costs of
vaccination include scared of injection, fear of side effect, do not like vaccination, and tradition
does not allow vaccination. Supply-side problem include lack of vaccine stocks at the clinic, and
health workers not visiting their villages. Misconception of vaccination include the belief that
vaccination do not have to be given to healthy people, and that infants should not receive the











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vaccine & Fear CCT 0.330*** 0.367*** 0.354*** 0.320***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028)
Observations 2467 2467 2465 2466
R-squared 0.126 0.143 0.143 0.107
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.292 0.242 0.280 0.289
Covariates X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X
Table A1.4: Did Messaging Change Feeling? (Endline)
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded
with GPS coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates). Missing observations are due to
missing values. Control group is the group of women under Vaccine CCT and under CCT=5.
Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. All the dependent variables
are dummy variables which take 1 if a respondent answers "very much" or "much" to the question
"How did you feel about the flipchart you were just shown: Feel frightened, Feel tensed, Feel
nervous and Feel uncomfortable" after the flipcharts intervention. Covariates include age, education
level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the
clinic before, and distance to the clinic. Mean of Dependent Variable is mean under Vaccine CCT. *
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Clinic CCT  -0.026 -0.010 0.001 -0.055*** -0.048 -0.056
(0.019) (0.040) (0.048) (0.020) (0.046) (0.057)
Vaccine CCT & Fear -0.038* 0.021 -0.036 -0.039* 0.024 -0.025
(0.020) (0.040) (0.041) (0.020) (0.040) (0.042)
Observations 1493 611 446 1493 611 446
R-squared 0.132 0.097 0.123 0.128 0.111 0.111
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.778 0.685 0.755 0.778 0.685 0.755
Covariates X X X X X X
Fixed Effect by Village (80 villages) X X X X X X
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with GPS
coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates). Control group is the group of women under
Vaccine CCT and under CCT=5. Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented.
Covariates include age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid
work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic. Mean of Dependent Variable is mean under
Vaccine CCT. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A1.5: Sub-group Analysis:  Past Experience and Pregnancy
Attended clinic Received vaccine
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Sample: Clinic CCT Vaccine CCT Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Age 24.659 24.916 -0.257 (0.456)
Muslim 0.459 0.467 -0.008 (0.036)
Highest education = no education 0.461 0.479 -0.018 (0.036)
Has paid work 0.442 0.404 0.038 (0.035)
Monthly household earning per capita (naira) 6298.6 6412.5 -113.9 (624.9)
Marital status = Single 0.216 0.191 0.025 (0.029)
Currently pregnant 0.170 0.176 -0.005 (0.028)
Have children 0.699 0.715 -0.016 (0.033)
Ever used clinic 0.648 0.67 -0.022 (0.034)
Distance to clinic (km) 1.664 1.621 0.043 (0.082)
Transport to clinic (naira) 129.04 131.29 -2.245 (14.72)
Opportunity costs to clinic (naira) 20.285 21.174 -0.888 (2.792)
Table A1.6: Selection to Attend the Clinic among Non-Experienced
Notes:  Sample used here is 778 women who visited an assigned clinic and never received tetanus
vaccination before under Clinic CCT or under Vaccine CCT. Standard errors in parenthesis. *





























Panel A: Never Received Tetanus Vaccine Before (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Vaccine & Fear CCT 0.054* 4.364** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.892 4.521***
(0.028) (1.668) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (1.465) (0.838)
Observations 1381 1378 1381 1381 1381 1380 1259
R-squared 0.095 0.101 0.115 0.108 0.108 0.087 0.373
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.448 36.533 0.486 0.568 0.664 28.975 88.235
Covariates X X X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X X X X
Panel B: Never Completed Tetanus Vaccine (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Vaccine & Fear CCT -0.011 -0.350 0.127** 0.144*** 0.115*** -3.172 10.483***
(0.039) (1.869) (0.053) (0.036) (0.038) (2.948) (1.439)
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 540 492
R-squared 0.240 0.158 0.233 0.096 0.117 0.212 0.530
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.523 44.704 0.704 0.782 0.847 44.051 88.245
Covariates X X X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X X X X
Panel C: Pregnant (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
Vaccine & Fear CCT 0.024 8.389*** 0.026 0.035 -0.017 2.923 4.610***
(0.070) (3.024) (0.070) (0.052) (0.055) (3.628) (1.550)
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 406 364
R-squared 0.114 0.134 0.198 0.199 0.198 0.147 0.417
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.462 38.769 0.636 0.720 0.804 31.331 91.216
Covariates X X X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X X X X X X
Table A1.7: Sub-group Analysis: Did Messaging Change Perception of Tetanus?
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,490 women whose household location is recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a
missing value on GPS coordinates). Missing observations are due to missing or invalid values. Control group is the group of women
under Vaccine CCT and under CCT=5. Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. All the dependent
variables indicate the measurement after the flipcharts intervention. "Likely to get tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 if a
respondent answers as " high likelihood" to the question "what is the likelihood that you get tetanus?" "Number of people who die of
tetanus" is the number of people out of 100 a respondent provided to a question "Once they have tetanus, how many people do you
think would die because of Tetanus?". "Very worried about tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 if a respondent answers "very
worried" to the question "How worried are you that you might get tetanus? Very worried, worried, not too worried, not worried at all?".
"Tetanus is very bad" is a binary variable which takes 1 is a respondent answers "very bad" to the question "How bad would it be if you
get tetanus? Very bad, bad, not too bad, not bad at all?". "Very important to be protected from tetanus" is a binary variable which takes
1 is a respondent answers "very important" to the question "How important is it for you to make sure that you are protected from
tetanus? Very important, important, not too important, not important at all?" "Vaccine efficacy" is the difference between hypothetical
number of unvaccinated people whom each respondent thinks get tetanus and number of vaccinated people who get tetanus. "Heart
rate" indicates the heart rate of a respondent measured. Covariates include age, education level, marital status, religion, if received
tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic, and baseline attitudes such as
likelihood of contracting tetanus, number of people the respondent thinks die out of tetanus, if the respondent is very worried about
tetanus, if the respondent thinks tetanus is very bad, subjective vaccine efficacy and heart rate. Mean of Dependent Variable is mean














Panel A: Demographics: 
Age 24.552 26.272 1.720***
Muslim 0.513 0.473 -0.040
Highest education = no education 0.480 0.487 0.007
Has Paid Work 0.398 0.504 0.106***
Monthly household earning per capita (naira) 6576.6 4781.8 -1794.8***
Marital status = Single 0.198 0.082 -0.116***
Currently pregnant 0.173 0.196 0.023
Have Children 0.675 0.905 0.230***
Ever used clinic 0.674 0.822 0.148***
Distance to Health Clinic 1.711 1.694 -0.017
Transport to clinic (naira) 131.310 116.397 -14.913
Opportunity costs to clinic (naira) 22.353 19.146 -3.207
Panel B: Attitudes toward Disease & Vaccine:
Likely to get tetanus 0.333 0.445 0.112***
Likely to avoid tetanus 0.522 0.664 0.142***
Very worried about Tetanus 0.260 0.491 0.231***
Tetanus is very bad 0.372 0.534 0.162***
Very important to be protected from tetanus 0.413 0.612 0.199***
Vaccine efficacy 20.928 24.25 3.322***
Table A1.8: Ex-Ante Characteristics by Past Tetanus Vaccine Experience
Notes:  Sample used here is 987 women with Vaccine CCT or Vaccine CCT & Fear who never
received tetanus vaccine before in (1) and 673 of women with Vaccine CCT or Vaccine CCT & Fear
who received tetanus vaccine before in (2). All the dependent variables are measured before the
flipcharts intervention. "Likely to get tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 if a respondent
answers as " high likelihood" to the question "What is the likelihood that you get tetanus?"  "Very
worried about tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 if a respondent answers "very worried" to the
question "How worried are you that you might get tetanus? Very worried, worried, not too worried,
not worried at all?" "Tetanus is very bad" is a binary variable which takes 1 is a respondent answers
"very bad" to the question "How bad would it be if you get tetanus? Very bad, bad, not too bad, not
bad at all?" "Very important to be protected from tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 is a
respondent answers "very important" to the question "How important is it for you to make sure that
you are protected from tetanus? Very important, important, not too important, not important at all?"
"Vaccine efficacy" is the difference between hypothetical number of unvaccinated people who get
tetanus and number of vaccinated people who get tetanus. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%
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Chapter 2
Learning from a Bitter Past?
Behavioral Effect of Child’s
Death on Mothers
2.1 Introduction
Child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa is extremely high (WHO, 2014). Moth-
ers’ utilization of health services, such as antenatal care, delivery assistance
and delivery at a health facility, is crucial for ensuring the health of children
and mothers. However, the health facility utilization remains severely limited
in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, 46 percent of pregnant
women in sub-Saharan Africa do not sufficiently visit clinics for antenatal
care (WHO, 2006), 52 percent of African women deliver at home instead of
at a health facility, and 53 percent of deliveries take place in the absence
of skilled health personnel (UNICEF, 2014). A number of past studies have
attributed financial and informational constraints to the low utilization of
health services in developing countries (Heller, 1982; Haddad and Fournier,
1995; Lindelow, 2002; Kasirye et al., 2004; Sharan et al., 2010; Lagarde et
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al., 2009; Kabakian-Khasholian and Campbell, 2007).
However, most past studies have ignored dynamic factors such as learn-
ing as a determinant of health service utilization. This paper examines the
potential effect of personal salient experience on health behaviors. In partic-
ular, I examine the effect of a child’s death on the mother’s health behaviors
for her subsequent children. Using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
from 26 African countries, I find that experiencing a child’s death during its
infancy makes mothers seek out health care for their subsequent children,
specifically delivery assistance and delivery at some health facility.
The dynamic decision-making theory, which takes into account past ex-
periences as a factor to affect the risk perception, predicts that the past
pessimistic experience induces behavioral change (Cohen et al., 2008). Us-
ing the example of the demand for insurance, Cohen et al. (2008) find that
among individuals who dot not buy insurance at the first period, they choose
to buy insurance at the second period if they experience damages before the
second period. Applying this model to my study, it predicts that among
mothers who dot not use health services at the time of delivery for the first
child, who experience the negative event of the first child’s death are more
likely to use the health services for the delivery of the second child.
Corno (2014) is one example that focused on the past experience as one
of the factors influencing the current health seeking behavior. By using
panel data in Tanzania, Corno found that agents sought medical care from
the different type of health provider if the past treatments were ineffective.
Corno’s finding indicates behavior updates based on the past experience.
Her paper, however, does not take into consideration the severity of the
past experience. The past experience might be more likely to change one’s
subsequent behavior if this experience is salient to increase the perceived
severity of the potential consequence of the current behavior. Thus, my
study evaluates if the salience of the past experience induces the behavioral
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change by focusing on child’s death.
The large sample of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) makes it
possible to detect the causal relationship between child’s death and subse-
quent health behaviors. This paper uses the data from 65,644 children from
46,780 women. Among the sample of my analysis, 10.1 percent of mothers
experienced the first child’s death, which is consistent with child mortality
rates across sub-Saharan Africa. In order to see the causal relationship of
the child’s death on subsequent health behaviors, I create the panel data
from DHS which is a cross-sectional data set. Because DHS contains de-
tailed information on the pregnancy history and the delivery history of each
respondent, I convert the data structure from each individual level to each
pregnancy level which enables me to observe health behaviors and health
outcomes among women over time.
The main analysis is based on simple difference estimators, comparing
mothers whose first child died to mothers whose first child survived. I eval-
uate the impact of the death of the first child on mothers’ health behaviors
for the second child. Although the child’s death is not randomly assigned,
and thus the simple difference estimator faces an endogeneity problem, the
potential bias due to this endogeneity seems to work against finding the pos-
itive effect of child’s death on subsequent health behaviors. This is because
child’s death is negatively correlated with factors such as wealth and edu-
cation level, but these factors are positively correlated with health service
utilization. I also evaluate the change in health behaviors between the first
and the second child among women whose first child died and compare it to
the change among women whose first child survived (difference-in-differences
estimators) to mitigate the endogeneity problem; the result is consistent with
the simple difference estimators.
I find significant changes in mother’s health seeking behaviors after the
experience of the death of her first child. Mothers who experience the first
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child’s death are 1.5 percentage points more likely to deliver the second child
with assistance and they are 2.5 percentage points more likely to deliver the
second child at a health facility than mothers who dot not experience the first
child’s death. This evidence supports the hypothesis that the salient negative
experience influences the current health seeking behaviors. My finding is
consistent with Corno’s finding because both of the studies found that the
past experience changed the subsequent behavior.
Because this study reveals that people change their behaviors if they
receive salient negative information through their experience, one potential
policy intervention is to emphasize and inform women of the negative effect of
non-utilization of health facilities in a salient manner to induce the utilization
of health facility. Future research should further explore this area as one
possibility to improve health service use, and to decrease child mortality.
2.2 Data
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 26 sub-Saharan African
countries contains information on mothers’ delivery records for the past five
years from the year when the survey was conducted. For each birth which
occurred during the reference period, mothers were asked if the child is alive,
about the timing of the child’s death if the child died, who assisted the de-
livery1 and the place where the delivery took place2.
Because the delivery records from this data set only captured the most
recent births within the past 5 years from the survey year, the data did not
include all the delivery history but it exclusively focused on younger women
1The list of the people who assisted the delivery is health personnel (doctor,
nurse/midwife/auxiliary midwife), other person (traditional birth attendant, rela-
tive/friend, other), or no one.
2The list of the place where the delivery took place is your home, other home, public
sector (government hospital, government health post, other public), private sector (private
hospital/clinic, other private), or other.
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at their reproductive age. Although this limitation reduces the sample size, it
has an analytical advantage. The data does not suffer from severe recall bias
as this analysis solely focuses on recent births. Focusing only on the recent
births also mitigates any changes in their environments and in their behaviors
such as new constructions of health facilities and shifts in their cultural values
towards western technologies. Mitigating such changes is important because
these changes could promote the health facility utilization independent of
the experience of child’s death.
I also restrict the sample to those who gave birth to the first child between
2000 and 2010 and I refer to this set of data as the total sample. The
main analysis uses the further restricted sample which includes only the first
and the second child; that is, I examine the relationship between women’s
experience of the first child’s death and health service utilizations for the
second child. By focusing only on the first and the second child, this analysis
mitigates the reproduction selection because most women deliver at least two
children. The total sample consists of 65,644 children from 46,780 women.
Out of these observations, my main analysis focuses on 16,390 women who
at least have two children.
Two main dependent variables used in this study are whether a mother
seeks any human assistance at delivery and whether a mother delivers at any
health facility. Human assistance includes health personnel such as doctors,
nurses, and midwife and other persons such as traditional birth attendants,
relatives and friends. Health facilities include hospitals, health centers, and
health clinics. Although the data also contains a variety of useful information
on health behaviors other than the ones related to delivery such as antenatal
care and postnatal care visits, they are not used in the analysis because of the
data structure. Women were asked about antenatal care and postnatal care
only for the last birth and as a result I cannot construct the panel structure
for these behaviors. In addition to information on mortality and delivery
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of the child, surveys contain data on mother’s demographic and economic
characteristics such as age and education as well as household characteristics
such as wealth level.
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of women and their households
when they have the second child, as well as the summary statistics of women’s
second children. On average, women are 23 years old. They have very low
level of education: 42.5 percent of women did not receive any education and
35.1 percent of women completed only primary school. 37.4 percent of the
women are Muslim. The number of children born is 2.1, which is much
smaller than the African average fertility rate (around 5). This is because
the analysis focuses on younger women who had the first child after 2000.
Fifty-seven percent of women had delivered the first child in the previous year
of second child’s birth. The percentage of women who experienced child’s
death at least once is 22.3 percent while 16.7 percent of women experienced
the first child’s death. The percentage of the first child’s death is high mainly
because the duration between the birth date of the first child and the survey
date tends to be longer than for other children.
Table 2.1 (Panel B) shows the household characteristics. The majority of
women (70.6 percent) live in rural areas and 43 percent of their households are
poor in terms of wealth level. Table 2.1 (Panel C) shows the characteristics
of the second children. Around half of the second children are female, and
eight percent of the children are not alive. On average, women perceived
that the children were born with average size.
In order to analyze differences in characteristics by experience of child’s
death, the sample is disaggregated. Table 2.1 (column 2 and 3) corresponds
to summary statistics respectively for women who lost their first child and
for women who did not. The health status of the first child (dead or alive)
is correlated with indicators of economic and health condition. Women who
lost their first child are almost 1 year younger. They are 9.9 percentage
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points more likely to have obtained no education. They are 8.7 percentage
points more likely to be Muslim. The number of children born is higher than
others by 0.09. One possible mechanism for the larger number of children is
that after the death of the child, mothers try to compensate for the loss by
engaging in more reproduction. Furthermore, women who experienced the
death of the first child are 0.71 years younger at their first pregnancy than
those who did not experience the death.
Child’s death is correlated with health behaviors as well as health and
economic outcomes. First of all, mothers in rural areas with poor households
are more likely to experience child’s death (Table 2.1 Panel B). Compared
to children of mothers whose first child is alive, the children of mothers with
experience of the first child’s death are 9 percentage points less likely to be
alive. The size of the second child at birth is smaller among mothers who
lost their first child, although the difference is insignificant (Table 2.1 Panel
C).
2.3 Framework
Cohen et al. (2008) constructed a model based on dynamic decision-making
theory which takes into account past experiences as a factor to affect the
risk perception. Using the example of the demand for insurance, their model
suggests that the past negative experience induces behavioral change. Specif-
ically, Cohen et al. (2008) find that among individuals who did not buy
insurance at the first period, they choose to buy insurance at the second
period if they experienced damages before the second period. Cohen’s model
directly applies to my study: the model predicts that among mothers who
did not use health services at the time of delivery for the first child, those
who experienced the pessimistic event, the first child’s death, are more likely
to use the health services for the delivery of the second child.
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Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, 1966) is the psychological model which
predicts health behaviors based on one’s perception. Past experiences influ-
ence subsequent health behaviors by affecting the perceived likelihood and
the perceived severity of a consequence of the past health behavior. Moth-
ers who have experienced their child’s death might perceive the general or
personal risks of infant mortality at the time of delivery. The realization of
a child’s death increases the perceived likelihood of the same outcome in the
subsequent delivery, and thus it could increase the health facility utilization
after child’s death. The realization of a child’s death could also increase the
perceived severity of the consequence of child delivery, which might again
promote the health behaviors.
At the same time, it is also possible that the experience of a child’s death
dis-incentivizes mothers from utilizing the health facility due to psychological
reasons. Psychological traumatic incidences may make women avoid a place
which reminds them of the trauma (Dempsey et al., 2000). For example,
if a mother delivers at a health facility and her child dies, the mother may
not want to try the same health facility for the next child but delivers at
home. The same mechanism may increase the take-up of health services if
the child’s death occurs at home. Thus even if women seek health service
after they experience the child’s death, this might not always be attributed to
the awareness of the importance in health facility utilization but they might
only switch their behaviors due to psychological factors. In the analysis, I
try to differentiate these two different mechanisms: learning the importance




My study estimates the effect of experiencing the child’s death on the utiliza-
tion of delivery assistance and of the health facility at the time of delivery for
the subsequent child. The main analysis restricts the sample to the first and
the second child. I first evaluate the effect of child’s death using difference-
in-differences estimators by comparing women’s health behaviors with and
without experiences of the first child’s death for the first and second child. I
then move to the analysis using the simple difference estimator by compar-
ing the utilization of health services at the time of the delivery of the second
child for women with and without the first child’s death. Results consistently
show that the first child’s death has significant effects both on the utilization
of delivery assistance and of health facilities at the time of delivery for the
second child.
2.4.1 Difference-in-Differences
Table 2.2 (Panel A and B) presents the difference-in-differences analysis.
The change in the health behavior of mothers from the time of the first
child’s delivery to that for the second child is compared among mothers
who lost their first child and mothers who did not. Main variables are the
utilization of delivery assistance and the utilization of health facilities at the
time of delivery. Panel A shows that 95.6 percent of mothers whose first
child eventually died utilized delivery assistance for the first child, while 97.4
percent of mothers whose first child survived utilized the assistance. For the
second child, both mothers, regardless of the status of the first child, reduced
the utilization of delivery assistance. However, mothers who lost their first
child had a smaller reduction in the probability of delivery assistance between
the first and the second delivery by 1.2 percentage points. This 1.2 percentage
points is the difference-in-differences estimator of the effect of the first child’s
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death on delivery assistance.
Panel B shows the similar analysis for the delivery place. Although both
mothers, those who lost their first child and those who did not, reduced the
likelihood of the delivery at health facilities for the second child, mothers who
lost their first child had a smaller reduction in the probability of delivery at
health facilities between the first and the second delivery by 5.1 percentage
points3.
This trend remains robust when the sample is restricted only to those
who delivered the first child without utilizing the health facility (Table 2.2,
Panel C and D). Among women who did not deliver the first child with any
assistance, the first child’s death increased the probability of seeking delivery
assistance for the second child by 11.6 percentage points. Similarly, the first
child’s death increased the probability of delivering the second child at a
health facility by 3.9 percentage points among mothers did not deliver the
first child at a health facility.
I now examine the effect of the first child’s death on the health seeking
behavior in a difference-in-differences regression framework. The reason of
using the regression framework is that I can include covariates which are
potentially correlated with the independent variable, the child’s death. To
examine the effect of the first child’s death on the health seeking behavior in
a difference-in-differences regression framework, I estimate
3This analysis is valid under the assumption that the difference of the health behavior
for the first child between mothers whose first child died and mothers whose first child
survived (the benchmark) reflect the correlation between background characteristics, such
as the levels of education and wealth, and child’s death. However, this benchmark is not
useful if the health behaviors for the first child among mothers is causing the first child’s
death.
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The sample is women who delivered at least two children. Utilization
of health services for the first or the second child is indicated by Yij=1 for
a mother i in a locality j. 1stChildDied indicates if a mother’s first child
died and 2ndChild is the dummy for the second child. The hypothesis is
that women utilize the health service more for the second child after they
experience their first child’s death than women whose first child did not die,
given all the other variables constant. X is a vector of controls including age,
age squared, Muslim dummy, rural dummy, wealth index dummy, education
level, and country dummies.
Table 2.3 (column 1) replicates the result from Table 2.2 (Panel A); for
the second child, mothers are 1.2 percentage points more likely to have deliv-
ery assistance if the first child died than if the first child survived. Column
2 shows the robust result after including covariates and district-level fixed
effects that the first child’s death increased the likelihood of delivery assis-
tance for the second child. This indicates that covariates have low correlation
with the child’s death which could bias the estimator. Similarly, Column 3
and 4 show the regression result for the delivery place. Column 3 replicates
the result from Table 2.2 (Panel B); mothers are 5.1 percentage points more
likely to deliver at health facilities for the second child if the first child died
than when the first child survived. Column 4 shows the consistent result even
after covariates and fixed effects are included in the regression. The effect
of the first child’s death on the delivery at health facilities is 3.9 percentage
points. The effect gets smaller once covariates are included from 5.1 to 3.9




A more straightforward way to examine changes in health behaviors after
the child’s death is to use the simple difference estimator. I compare the
utilization of delivery assistance and of health facilities at the time of delivery
for the second child among women with and without the experience of the
first child’s death, given the past health behaviors as well as background
characteristics constant. To examine the effect of first child’s death on the
health seeking behavior for the second child in a simple-difference regression
framework, I estimate
Yij = α + β1Deathij +Xij
′µ+ ij (2.2)
Utilization of the health service for the second child is indicated by Yij=1
for a mother i in a locality j. Death indicates if a mother’s first child died. I
hypothesize that those who experience the first child’s death utilize the health
service more for the second child than women whose first child is alive, given
all the other variables constant. X is a vector of controls included in (2.1)
as well as variables which indicate the health service utilization for the first
child. The variable of the past health behavior for the first child has a role
to capture a trend of mother’s health behavior while the death experience
can measure deviation from the trend.
The child’s death is negatively correlated with both delivery assistance
and delivery at a health facility if past health behaviors are not taken into
consideration. The likelihood of child’s death is 2.2 to 3.0 percentage points
higher if mothers do not deliver with any assistance, and it is 1.7 to 2.0
percentage points higher if mothers do not deliver at a health facility (Table
2.4). Table 2.4 also shows that women with poor economic backgrounds are
more likely to experience their child’s death (Table 2.4 column 1 and 2) and
at the same time, they are less likely to use health facilities (Table 2.4 column
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3 to 6). Thus it is necessary to capture their past behavior as a trend and to
factor out the deviation which is captured by the child’s death.
Table 2.5 (Panel A) shows the effect of the first child’s death on delivery
assistance for the second child. First, column 1 shows that without control-
ling for covariates, the child’s death is negatively correlated with delivery
assistance. This is because of the correlation between covariates and child’s
death as shown in Table 2.4. Table 2.5 (column 2) includes delivery assis-
tance for the first child as one of controls and I find that the null effect of
the child’s death, and there is a strong correlation between the assistance
at the first child and that for the second child. Once I control for various
covariates and include district-level fixed effects, experiencing the first child’s
death increases the probability of seeking delivery assistance for the second
child by 1.5 percentage points. Although the effect of a child’s death on de-
livery assistance is considerably small, this is because a very high proportion
of mothers (94.5 percent) already received delivery assistance for the first
child.
Table 2.5 (column 4 and 5) restricts the sample to mothers who delivered
the first child without any assistance. Without controls, the first child’s
death increased the probability of seeking assistance for the next child by 11.6
percentage points (column 4), while the effect of the child’s death reduced to
6.9 percentage points with controls. The effect of the child’s death is strong
among women who did not use delivery assistance for the first child.
Table 2.5 (Panel B) shows the effect of the first child’s death on the
delivery place for the second child. Column 6 shows that the child’s death is
strongly negatively correlated with the delivery at a health facility without
any covariates. But it is important to include the past health behaviors in
the regression. Once the dummy variable to indicate if a mother delivered a
first child at a health facility is included, the first child’s death has a positive
effect on the delivery at health facilities for the second child (column 7). With
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covariates and fixed effects, experiencing the first child’s death increases the
probability of second child delivery at some facility by 2.5 percentage points
(column 8).
Among those who delivered the first child at home, the first child’s death
increased the probability of delivery at a health facility for the second child
by 3.9 percent percentage points (Table 2.5, column 9), although the effect
of the child’s death gets weaker(1.6 percentage points) and insignificant with
controls and fixed effects (column 10)4.
The timing of the child’s death could be an important variation to induce
the behavioral change. For example, if a child dies around the delivery, the
mother may attribute the cause of the child’s death more to the environment
at the delivery than the case in which the child dies at a later time. Table 2.6
shows the differential effect of the death by the timing of the death. Early
death occurrences weakly promote more of delivery assistance than the later
death (Table 2.6 column 1 and 2), but it is only suggestive because of the
power5. Among those who delivered the first child without any assistance,
the first child’s death within one month increases the likelihood of seeking
delivery assistance for the second child by 19.3 percentage points while the
child’s death later than 1 month mostly has less impact on delivery assis-
tance for the second child (column 3). However, the effect disappears once
covariates and fixed effects are included (column 4).
On the other hand, early death occurrences have a stronger and more
positive effect on the subsequent delivery at a health facility than the later
death. Death of the first child within one month increases the probability of
delivering at a health facility for the second child by 4.1 percentage points,
4The effect of the first child’s death on health behaviors among those who did not
utilize health facilities for the first child becomes insignificant once the district-level fixed
effect is included. This might be due to the limited observation within the district, or the
district is not the correct unit for the fixed-effect analysis.
5Note that the rate of delivery assistance was already very high. for the first child
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while the first child’s death which occurred later than 1 month did not have
any significant effect on the delivery place for the second child (Table 2.6
column 5 and 6). This is evidence that the child’s death influences one’s be-
haviors around delivery if she links the child’s death more with child delivery
such as complications at birth. Table 2.6 (column 7) shows the consistent
result that the child’s death right after birth changes the health behaviors
around delivery; the child’s death within 1 month increases the likelihood of
the delivery at health facilities by 8.2 percentage points among women who
delivered the first child at home, although the inclusion of covariates and
fixed effects cancels out the effect (column 8). Overall, this result adds to
the evidence that mothers change their behavior around delivery because the
child’s death signals the need for the behavioral change around delivery.
Although results have shown that the child’s death drives mother’s health
behaviors, this behavioral change can be attributed not to learning but sim-
ply to switching. Because child’s death is a significant negative shock on
mothers, they might only switch their behaviors due to psychological fac-
tors such as trauma, not because they learn the importance of health service
utilization. However, Table 2.7 confirms that the behavioral change is not
driven by switching. If switching occurs, those who delivered the first child
with assistance or at a health facility, and who lost the first child, can be
more likely to deliver the second child without the assistance and at home.
However, I do not find this result. Among women who delivered the first
child with assistance, the first child’s death did not increase the likelihood
that they delivered the second child without any assistance. Similarly, among
women who delivered the first child at a health facility, the first child’s death
did not increase the likelihood that they delivered the second child at home.
This result is suggestive evidence that women actually learn the importance
of utilizing health service from the salient experience of their child’s death.
So far, the analysis has been limited to the first and second child but it
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could be extended to all the children born on or after 2000. To examine the
effect of the child’s death in the past on the health seeking behavior for the
subsequent child in a regression framework, I estimate
Yijk = α + β1Deathij(k−1) +Xijk ′µ+ ijk (2.3)
Utilization of health services for the k-th child is indicated by Yijk=1 for
a mother i in a locality j. Deathij(k−1) indicates if a mother’s (k − 1)-th
child died. In order to capture the characteristics specific to each birth, the
vector of controls X includes the birth-order dummies in addition to all the
variables included in the regression specification (2).
The results under the specification (3) are consistent with the main result
which examines the effect of first child’s death on health behaviors for the
second child. A previous child’s death increases the probability of seeking
delivery assistance for the subsequent child by 1.0 percentage points, and it
increases the probability of delivering the subsequent child at a health facility
by 2.4 percentage points (Table 2.8). Furthermore, I find the consistent result
that the child’s death induces the subsequent health behaviors even when I
restrict the sample to mothers who lost at least one child at some point
(Table 2.8 column 3 and 6).
Overall, African mothers learn from a bitter salient past, a child’s death,
to update their health seeking behaviors. The child’s death is a driving force
for mothers to seek delivery assistance and to deliver at some health facility
for the subsequent child.
2.5 Consideration for Identification Strategy
Here I discuss the potential econometric problems which can threaten the
validity of regression model as introduced in (2). Although the concern of re-
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verse causality is mitigated by restricting the sample to the first child’s death
and health service use for the second child, examining the model specifica-
tions with using the simple OLS could still cause biased estimators because
the experience of the child’s death is not randomly assigned. Unobservable
factors can affect mothers’ experience of their child’s death.
However, biases induced by the non-randomness seem to work against the
hypothesis. As presented in Table 2.4, the use of health services is an im-
portant determinant of a child’s survival. Other demographic and economic
factors also explain the child’s health outcome. Lower education attainment
and poorer wealth level significantly increases the probability of the child’s
death while they are correlated with lower health service utilization (Table
2.4 column 3 to 6). It implies that mothers who lost the first child have
characteristics which are negatively correlated with the likelihood of health
service utilization. Thus finding positive correlation between the first child’s
death and the health service use for the second child is not induced by biases
as far as they work against finding the result.
Unobservable genetic factors should also be correlated with the child’s
death. If a mother uses a health facility more because of her genetic problem
which increases the probability of her child’s death, then it induces the up-
ward bias in the specification (2). However, this bias should be mitigated by
one of the control variables, health service use for the first child. If she learns
her genetic problem through the experience of her child’s death to change
the health seeking behavior for the subsequent child, this is exactly what this
analysis is trying to observe. Furthermore, I also analyze the effect of child’s
death on subsequent health behaviors only among those who lost at least one
child at some point (Table 2.8) and find that mothers change behaviors after
the child’s death.
Another important concern is the reproduction decision for the second
child. Because the main sample is restricted to women who have at least
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two children within 5 years from the survey year, there is a possibility of the
sample selection. Two factors could affect this selection. One is the genetics
of the woman and another is the preference for sexual activities or intensive
reproduction. Specification (1) and (2) eliminates women who are genetically
less capable of reproduction and it is possible that this genetic reproductive
ability motivates women to seek assistance at a health facility more than
others. Similarly, the sample only includes those who have the stronger
preference for the sexual behavior or the intensive reproduction within a
fixed period. This preference can affect the health behavior at delivery in
either way; if they know about their preference and that it can risk their
infant at delivery, they might care to seek assistance more than others. If,
on the other hand, they are risky both in the reproduction behavior as well
as in general health behaviors, they might not care for delivery assistance as
much as others do. However, I claim that the selection bias does not cause
a serious problem because the average birth interval in Africa is 2.28 years
(DHS) thus the average woman has two or more children within 5 years.
My data is not restrictive to a specific sample, but deals with the average
population.
Table 2.1 shows that if the first child survived, they were less likely to
have more children than when the first child died. This indicates another
possible selection to have the second child by the first child’s status. Among
women whose first child survived, if the decision to have additional child is
negatively correlated with health behaviors around delivery, this selection
might have caused the upward bias for the main result.
The last concern is the change in the access to health facilities over time.
For example, if the government decides to construct health facilities inten-
sively in areas with worse health outcomes, people in such areas might im-
prove their health behaviors simply because they benefit from the better
access to health services over time. Because DHS does not have information
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on the access to health facilities, I control for this factor by including district-
level fixed effects in the regression analysis. The result, that child’s death
improved the subsequent health behaviors, has been consistent with or with-
out fixed effects. However, it should be noted that this study cannot address
changes in access to health facilities if such changes occur in geographical
units which are smaller than the district.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines whether the salient and negative experiences result in
the change in health behaviors. Specifically I analyze the effect of a child’s
death on the utilization of health services at the next child’s delivery. These
health services include delivery assistance and delivery at a health facility.
Although the child’s death does not randomly occur, the simple OLS method
is used because potential biases seem to work against finding the result. I find
significant changes in health seeking behavior after the experience of a child’s
death. Mothers who experienced the first child’s death are 1.5 percentage
point more likely to deliver with some assistance and 2.5 percentage points
more likely to deliver the second child at some health facility than moth-
ers who did not experience the first child’s death. This evidence supports
the claim that past negative experience affects the current health seeking
behavior if the experience is severe.
An important policy implication emerges from this study. Because this
study reveals that people change their behaviors if they receive salient neg-
ative information through their experience, policy makers could focus on
intervention programs which emphasize and inform mothers about negative
consequences of non-utilization of facilities to increase the use of health facili-
ties. For example, in order to increase the immunization rate in African coun-
tries, information emphasizing the negative consequence of non-vaccination
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such as severe disease symptoms might increase the vaccination take-up by
influencing the perceived risk and severity of the disease. Thus an obvious
question remaining for future research is whether negative information is the
important factor for behavioral change and whether the negative information
can be transmitted not only through personal experience but also through
other people’s experiences.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Woman's characteristics
Age 23.191 22.429 23.347  -0.918***
Highest education= None 0.425 0.508 0.409 0.099***
Highest education= Primary 0.351 0.335 0.354  -0.019*
Highest education= Secondary 0.197 0.146 0.207  -0.061***
Highest education= Tertiary or more 0.027 0.010 0.030  -0.020***
Muslim 0.374 0.447 0.360 0.087***
Total children ever born 2.140 2.212 2.124 0.088***
Births in past year 0.573 0.540 0.578  -0.038**
Children ever died 0.223 1.000 0.067 0.933***
Number of children dead 1.143 1.176 1.040 0.136***
First child died 0.167 1.000 0.000 1.000***
Age at the first pregnancy 19.600 19.012 19.723  -0.711***
Panel B: Household characteristics
Rural 0.706 0.771 0.692 0.079***
Wealth index = Poorest 0.224 0.241 0.218 0.023**
Wealth index = Poorer 0.209 0.250 0.200 0.050***
Wealth index = Middle 0.203 0.200 0.203 -0.003
Wealth index = Richer 0.183 0.178 0.185 -0.007
Wealth index = Richest 0.183 0.131 0.193  -0.062***
Panel C: Second child's characteristics
Female 0.490 0.494 0.490 0.004
Alive 0.923 0.848 0.938  -0.090***
Size of baby at birth 3.228 3.219 3.232 -0.013
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Woman, Household, and Second Child 
Sample:
First Child   
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who have at least 2 children and gave birth to the first child
between the year of 2000 and 2010. Number of children dead is conditioned on ever died. Size of baby
at birth: 1=very small, 2=smaller than average, 3=average, 4=larger than average, 5=very large.
Countries included in the analysis are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, CDR, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagaskar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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for first child for second child Difference
First child died 0.956(N=4596) 0.945(N=2757)  -0.010**
First child did not die 0.974(N=41899) 0.951(N=13817)  -0.023***
Difference  -0.018*** -0.006  0.012***
Panel B: Delivery Place
for first child for second child Difference
First child died 0.530(N=4583) 0.475(N=2756)  -0.054***
First child did not die 0.634(N=41826) 0.528(N=13794)  -0.106***
Difference  -0.105***  -0.053***  0.051***
Delivery assistance
for second child
First child died 0.298(N=131)
First child did not die 0.182(N=478)
Difference  0.116**
Panel D: Second Delivery Place Among Women with First Delivery at Home
Delivery at health facility 
for second child
First child died 0.175(N=1395)
First child did not die 0.136(N=5713)
Difference  0.039***
Table 2.2: Difference-in-Differences Estimator of Child's Death
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who gave birth to the first child between the year of 2000
and 2010. Countries included in the analysis are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo,
CDR, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagaskar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A: Delivery Assistance
Delivery assistance 
Delivery at health facility 
Panel C: Second Delivery Assitance Among Women with First Delivery without Assistance
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Dependent vairiables:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First child died -0.018*** -0.007** -0.105*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Second child -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.106*** -0.063***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
(First child died)*(Second child) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.051*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant 0.974*** 1.012*** 0.634*** 0.763***
(0.001) (0.021) (0.004) (0.044)
Observations 63069 60503 62959 60398
R-squared 0.004 0.003 0.012 0.028
Covariates X X
Fixed effect (District-level) X X
Clustered standard error X X X X
Delivery at health facility 
Table 2.3: Effect of Child's Death on Delivery Behavior (DID)
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who gave birth to the first child between the year of
2000 and 2010. Robust standard errors clustered by districts with district fixed effects are in
parenthesis. There are 10,210 districts. Covariates include age, age2, Muslim, rural, wealth level,
and education level. Countries included in the analysis are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad,
Congo, CDR, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagaskar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland,




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assistance at first delivery -0.022** -0.030**
(0.011) (0.012)
First delivery at health facility -0.020***-0.017***
(0.004) (0.005)
Age  0.003 0.005* 0.003* -0.001 0.026*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Muslim 0.012*** 0.010 -0.043*** -0.004 -0.092*** 0.013
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)
Rural 0.008* . -0.014*** . -0.155*** .
(0.004) . (0.002) . (0.008) .
Wealth index = Poorest 0.007 0.010 -0.026*** -0.010** -0.237***-0.125***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011)
Wealth index = Poorer 0.012** 0.012 -0.018*** -0.005 -0.166***-0.096***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Wealth index = Middle 0.008 0.005 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.089***-0.071***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Wealth index = Richer 0.011*** 0.007 -0.004** -0.000 -0.036***-0.032***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
Highest education= None 0.069*** 0.057*** -0.023***-0.022*** -0.248***-0.211***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012)
Highest education= Primary 0.048*** 0.037*** 0.004 -0.014*** -0.106***-0.147***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011)
Highest education= Secondary 0.026*** 0.020** 0.003* -0.008*** -0.013* -0.058***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010)
Constant 0.024 0.009 0.974*** 1.011*** 0.620*** 0.770***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.020) (0.020) (0.047) (0.046)
Observations 44455 44455 44624 44624 44542 44542
R-squared 0.010 0.003 0.040 0.001 0.205 0.023
Mean of dependent variables 0.101 0.101 0.972 0.972 0.624 0.624
Fixed effect (District-level) X X X
Clustered standard error X X X X X X
First delivery at
health facility
Table 2.4: Determinants of Child's Death and Delivery Behavior
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who gave birth to the first child between the year of 2000
and 2010. Robust standard errors clustered by districts with district fixed effects are in parenthesis.
There are 10,210 districts. Covariates include age, age2, Muslim, rural, wealth level, and education
level. Column (6)-(10) includes birth-order dummy. Countries included in the analysis are Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, CDR, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagaskar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. * significant at 10%;





Panel A: Delivery Assistance
Sample:
Dependent variables:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child died -0.006 0.004 0.015*** 0.116*** 0.069
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.044) (0.049)
Assistance at first delivery 0.772*** 0.674***
(0.017) (0.024)
Constant 0.951*** 0.206*** 0.339*** 0.182*** -0.065
(0.002) (0.017) (0.059) (0.018) (0.646)
Observations 16574 16390 15705 609 607
R-squared 0.000 0.450 0.356 0.014 0.058
Covariates X X
Fixed effect (District-level) X X
Clustered standard error X X X X X
Panel B: Delivery Place
Sample:
Dependent variables:
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
First child died -0.053*** 0.015* 0.025** 0.039*** 0.016
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
First delivery at health facility 0.668*** 0.412***
(0.006) (0.013)
Constant 0.528*** 0.141*** 0.448*** 0.136*** 0.402
(0.006) (0.005) (0.105) (0.005) (0.256)
Observations 16550 16342 15660 7108 6843
R-squared 0.002 0.438 0.203 0.002 0.008
Covariates X X
Fixed effect (District-level) X X




Second delivery at health facility
Table 2.5: Effect of First Child's Death on Second Delivery
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who gave birth to the first child between the year of
2000 and 2010. Robust standard errors clustered by districts with district fixed effects are in
parenthesis. There are 7,461 districts for the total sample analysis. For column 4 and 5, there are
442 districs, and for column 9 and 10, there are 3,855 districts. Covariates include age, age2,
Muslim, rural, wealth level, and education level. Countries included in the analysis are Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, CDR, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagaskar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
First child delivered
without any assistance





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First child died within --- month since birth:
1 month 0.006 0.015* 0.193*** 0.092 0.054***0.041***0.082*** 0.029
(0.006) (0.008) (0.061) (0.078) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022)
2 month 0.003 0.012 0.034 0.005 -0.001 0.013 0.024 0.016
(0.005) (0.007) (0.059) (0.063) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
3 month 0.004 0.023 0.193** 0.149 -0.035* 0.013 -0.014 -0.015
(0.010) (0.015) (0.084) (0.117) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
4-6 month -0.007 0.012 -0.057 0.028 -0.005 0.034 0.018 0.050
(0.017) (0.030) (0.143) (0.046) (0.039) (0.045) (0.051) (0.051)
Assistance at first delivery0.772***0.674***
(0.017) (0.024)
First delivery at health facility 0.667***0.412***
(0.006) (0.013)
Constant 0.206***0.340*** 0.182*** -0.023 0.141***0.445*** 0.136*** 0.399
(0.017) (0.059) (0.018) (0.652) (0.005) (0.105) (0.005) (0.254)
Observations 16390 15705 609 607 16342 15660 7108 6843
R-squared 0.450 0.356 0.024 0.069 0.438 0.203 0.004 0.009
Covariates X X X X
Fixed effect (District-level) X X X X
Clustered standard error X X X X X X X X
Table 2.6: Differential Effect of Child's Death by Timing
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who experienced death of their own children and gave birth to
the first child between the year of 2000 and 2010. Robust standard errors clustered by districts with
district fixed effects are in parenthesis.  There are 7,461 districts for the total sample analysis. For column
3 and 4, there are 442 districs, and for column 7 and 8, there are 3,855 districts. Covariates include age,
age2, Muslim, rural, wealth level, and education level. Countries included in the analysis are Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, CDR, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagaskar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%













(1) (2) (3) (4)
First child died 0.001 -0.007 0.010 -0.009
(0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016)
Constant 0.021*** -0.014 0.188*** 0.011
(0.001) (0.046) (0.005) (0.154)
Observations 15781 15098 9234 8817
R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.015
Covariates X X
Fixed effect (District-level) X X
Clustered standard error X X X X
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who gave birth to the first child between the year of 2000
and 2010. Robust standard errors clustered by districts with district fixed effects are in parenthesis.
There are 7,382 districts for column 2, and 5,200 districts for column 4. Covariates include age, age2,
Muslim, rural, wealth level, and education level. Countries included in the analysis are Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, CDR, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagaskar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2.7: Switching Behavior
First child delivered
with assistance
Second delivery without assistance
First child delivered at
health facility










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Previous child died 0.002 0.010** 0.006 0.013 0.024*** 0.029*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
Assistance at previous child delivery0.757***0.619*** 0.380***
(0.017) (0.025) (0.073)
Deliver previous child at health facility 0.672***0.364*** 0.110***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.035)
Constant 0.242***0.397*** 0.573* -0.013 0.519*** 0.715*
(0.018) (0.059) (0.321) (0.008) (0.105) (0.403)
Observations 18598 17809 4388 18545 17759 4376
R-squared 0.436 0.294 0.342 0.445 0.162 0.307
Covariates X X X X
Fixed effect (District-level) X X X X
Clustered standard error X X X X X X
Table 2.8:  Effect of  "i-1"th Child's Death on Delivery for "i"th Child
Notes:  The Sample is restricted to women who gave birth to the first child between the year of 2000 and
2010. Previous child refers to "i-1"th child. Robust standard errors clustered by districts with district fixed
effects are in parenthesis. There are 7,468 districts for the main analysis (column 2 and 5), and 2,709
districts for column 3 and 6. Covariates include age, age2, Muslim, rural, wealth level, and education
level. Countries included in the analysis are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, CDR, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagaskar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total Total
Assistance at "i"th delivery "i"th delivery at health facility
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Chapter 3
Influence of Social Networks on
Vaccine Take-up
among Women in Rural Nigeria
3.1 Introduction
The role of social networks in vaccination behaviors among other health
behaviors deserves attention because of the potential externalities of the dis-
ease within a social network that vaccination can prevent. Theoretically and
practically, the effect of peers on one’s vaccination decision can be positive or
negative due to various mechanisms such as information sharing, cost shar-
ing, imitation, and free-riding (Bodine-Baron, 2013; Philpson, 2000). In the
context of developed countries, Rao et al. (2007) find positive peer effects on
the perception of vaccine benefits as well as on vaccination behavior by using
a random assignment of dormitory rooms among American undergraduates.
On the other hand, Ibuka et al. (2014) find that vaccinations are discouraged
among peers due to the free-riding problem using a lab experiment in the
U.S.
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Although the potential role of peers in effective disease control can be
crucial, especially in developing countries where disease prevalences are high,
there has not been a causal study of peer effect on vaccination in develop-
ing countries. This study is the first to causally examine the peer effect
on vaccination in Africa.1 Measuring the causal effect of social networks
has proven challenging because the selection of peers is endogenous (Manski,
1993). However, recent studies have overcome this methodological issue by
implementing experiments that can influence peers’ behaviors exogenously.
For example, Miguel and Kremer (2004) uses the random variation of the dis-
tribution of deworming drugs at school level and find that untreated students
who are close to treated schools benefit from the spillover of the project. God-
lonton and Thornton (2012) measure the effect of social networks on learning
HIV results by using the exogenous variation of cash incentives offered to in-
dividuals.
This paper focuses on vaccination behaviors against tetanus among women
at child-bearing age. Tetanus is a non-communicable disease; thus, I control
for the potential free-riding problem to evaluate the peer effects. Nigeria,
the study site, is one of twenty five countries where tetanus remains a major
public health problem (WHO, 2013). Tetanus contributes to high neonatal
mortality rate, up to 20 percent in Nigeria (Oruamabo, 2007). This is be-
cause fatality of neonatal tetanus reaches almost 100 percent without medical
treatment, which is difficult to obtain in rural Africa (Blencowe et al, 2010).
Neonatal tetanus is typically contracted at the time of delivery when the um-
bilical cord is cut with a non-sterile instrument, and tetanus-toxoid vaccine
is the most effective way to prevent neonatal tetanus. However, the take-up
of tetanus vaccines in Nigeria remains low: 52.8 percent (DHS, 2013). Elim-
inating the possibility of free-riding problem, this paper evaluates if peers
1Although Goldberg (2014) presents the relationship between social networks and vacci-
nation behavior in Nigeria, her methodology does not identify a causal relationship because
she has not taken into account that the formation of social networks is endogenous.
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encourage an individual’s vaccination.
This paper analyzes the effect of various social networks on one’s vacci-
nation decision as well as performs a detailed analysis on the characteristics
of friends who have a stronger influence on one’s vaccination in rural Nige-
ria. I analyze an experiment that randomized the amount of cash incentives,
conditional cash transfer (CCT), to women to receive a tetanus-toxoid vac-
cination at an assigned clinic. The random allocation of cash incentives to
individuals allows the causal study of peer effect on vaccination decision be-
cause I have previously observed that the randomly-assigned cash incentives
strongly increased the likelihood that one received a vaccination.
I find that social networks have a strong influence on vaccine take-up.
Social networks among villagers, neighbors, and friends all significantly in-
crease one’s vaccine take-up. For example, if a respondent has one additional
friend who has been vaccinated, it increases the likelihood of her vaccination
by 17.2 percentage points. I also address the potential mechanism of the
positive effect of social networks; social networks enhance vaccination not
through cost sharing or through social learning about others’ behavior, but
possibly through information sharing or collective decision making. Although
this is not the first causal study of the social network, my result adds to the
literature by methodologically overcoming endogeneity through using a ran-
dom variation of peers’ behavior and by finding very strong peer effects on
vaccination.23
2It is important to contrast the difference in the role of social networks that I find on
a health behavior and what Miguel and Kremer (2007) find. While they find a negative
effect of social networks on deworming pill take-up in Kenya, my study finds a positive
effect on vaccination take-up. This contrast can be attributed to the difference in nature of
products. Deworming pills benefit the treated people, but they also greatly benefit others
in the community. As a result, the take-up of deworming pills might decrease if people
free-ride on this public good. On the other hand, tetanus-toxoid vaccines only benefit the
vaccinated individuals because tetanus is not transmitted from person to person. Thus
the take-up increases once people realize the benefit of the vaccine through their peers.
3The positive effect of social networks is specific to tetanus-toxoid vaccine as tetanus is
not a contagious disease. Whether take-up of other vaccines against contagious diseases
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Among other social networks, this paper further evaluates the effect of a
best friend’s vaccination on one’s vaccination behaviors. I find that the best
friend’s vaccination increases one’s vaccination probability by 25.8 percent-
age points. But the influence of a best friend’s vaccination differs greatly
depending on the distance to the clinic and the distance between the re-
spondent and her best friend. The best friend’s vaccination status increases
the likelihood that one receives a vaccination only if the distance between
one’s house and the health clinic is more than 500 meters. If the distance to
the health clinic is less than 500 meters, the best friend no longer influences
one’s vaccination decision. I also find that the influence of the best friend
receiving a vaccine is 62.6 percentage points more if the distance between a
respondent’s house and her best friend’s house is close (less than 25 meters).
On the other hand, the best friend’s vaccination has no effect on one’s vacci-
nation decision if the friends live more than 25 meters apart. Friends matter
when the coordination to visit a clinic together eases psychological costs and
the coordination is easy.
Lastly, I find that the influence of best friend’s vaccination decision de-
pends on prior beliefs about vaccine safety. The best friend’s vaccination
increases the likelihood of one’s vaccination by 80.7 percentage points if both
the respondent and her best friend do not have concerns about the side effect
of the vaccination. On the other hand, the best friend’s vaccination does not
affect one’s vaccination decision if either the respondent or her best friend
has concerns about the side effect of the vaccination.
Overall, my results suggest important policy implications. My finding of
strong effects of peers as well as cash incentives on vaccine take-up implies
that governments should invest more in CCTs for vaccination. Social benefits
of investing in CCTs for vaccines are higher if the peer effect is taken into
have positive peer effects is beyond the scope of this study, but it is worth examining in
future work.
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consideration because recipients of CCTs positively influence their peers for
vaccination.
This paper also suggests that different policies might be effective, de-
pending on the access to clinics and friends, and the common beliefs in each
region. First, we should encourage social interactions especially in locations
where the access to the health clinic is difficult. For example, promoting the
coordination of transportation among people in remote villages to visit the
clinic might increase their health service utilization. Second, relying only on
the influence of social networks would not be sufficient to increase vaccination
rate evenly, because peers are influential only if they live close by. Further-
more, peers’ vaccinations do not influence one’s vaccination decision if she
has prior concerns about vaccination. Along with promoting coordination
among villagers for the clinic visit, it might be important to carry out the
information intervention to emphasize the benefits of vaccination especially
in remote areas to maximize the influence of social networks.
3.2 Experiment and Data
3.2.1 Setting
This study is based on a larger project to measure the relative importance of
psychic costs of vaccination, monetary costs, and salient disease information
as potential barriers to vaccination in rural Nigeria. I conducted the larger
study in Jada local government area, which exhibited the lowest tetanus
toxoid vaccination rate in Adamawa state, one of the northeastern states.
This project was conducted in March through May, 2013. The sample
was drawn from three-stage sampling. First, 10 health clinics were selected
in a way that they were geographically spread across Jada local government.
There was a total of 11 wards (9 rural wards and 2 urban wards) spanning
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all the villages in Jada and the study exclusively focused on 9 rural wards
with each ward having 1 to 5 public health clinics. I selected the main health
clinic from each ward with the exception of one large ward under which I
selected 2 clinics, which brought the total to 10 clinics for my study.
Second, I selected a total of 80 villages which fell within one of the catch-
ment areas of each clinic. Catchment areas of each health clinic were defined
by the primary healthcare development agency which was responsible for na-
tional immunization campaigns. All the villages within a catchment area of
each health clinic were selected if the village had more than 10 households
and the total number of villages within a clinic’s catchment area did not ex-
ceed 15. If it did, the priority was given to villages with the furthest distance
from the health clinic.
Third, one eligible woman, who was aged 15 to 35, was selected from
each household in each village. The survey team visited all the households
in each village to find out if there were any eligible women. A woman was
ineligible if she had received a tetanus vaccination in the 6 months prior to
the time of the survey so as to avoid overdose; the second dose of the tetanus
vaccine should be given to individuals at least 6 months from the first dose.
In cases where there was more than one eligible woman in one household,
the first priority was given to pregnant women who had not received tetanus-
toxoid vaccination in the past 6 months. If there were no eligible pregnant
woman in the household, then the second priority was given to women who
had never received a tetanus vaccination before. If we still did not find any
eligible women with a priority, then women who had not receive a tetanus
vaccine in the past 6 months were invited to participate in the survey. If
there was more than one woman who was eligible under the same priority,
then we randomly picked one of the eligible women by selecting the first one
in alphabetical order of the first name. On average, each health clinic covered
249 respondents from 9.6 villages in my study.
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3.2.2 Experimental Design
The larger study randomized several factors: the amount of cash incentives,
the condition of cash incentives, and the salience of information. I found
that a small cash incentive ($2) increased the vaccine take-up by almost 20
percentage points, from 50 percent. On the other hand, two different con-
ditions under which a respondent could receive cash incentives, either clinic
attendance or vaccination at the clinic attendance, did not result in differ-
ence in the clinic attendance rate. The salient information which emphasized
the severity of tetanus did not promote vaccination behavior, either. Thus,
this paper focuses only on the random variation in the amount of cash in-
centives offered to individuals because other factors did not influence one’s
vaccination decision (Sato, 2015).
I randomly varied the amount of conditional cash transfer (CCT) offered
to each respondent. The probability of one being offered each amount of cash
incentives was roughly the same in each village. The amount of money offered
was randomly assigned to each respondent: either 5 naira (approximately 3.3
US. cents), 300 naira (2 US. dollars) or 800 naira (5.3 US. dollars). As a ref-
erence, the average daily earnings per household is approximately 1,000 naira
and that per person is 144 naira in my study. The average transportation
cost to and from the health clinic is about 250 naira among those who need
to pay for the transportation while 50 percent of the sample do not pay for
the transportation in my study.
Although I designed the study so that the probability of one being offered
each amount of cash incentives is roughly the same in each village, the nature
of my study creates a village-level variation of the percentage of respondents
who received the highest amount of CCT. This is because the assignment of
the amount of CCT to each respondent was randomly determined by inter-
viewers picking a questionnaire in front of each respondent, which indicated
a randomly-assigned amount of cash incentives in the middle of the pages of
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each questionnaire. In other words, the assignment of the amount of CCT
to each respondent was not determined beforehand.
3.2.3 Data
Social Networks
This study collected information about social networks at the baseline survey.
Namely, this study defines villages, neighbors, and friends as social networks.
Below I explain how I collected the information.
Village
I use the pre-determined unit of the social network, village, to identify the
peer effect. The average number of women the study covered in each village
was relatively small, the total number of women who were in the study in a
village was 31.2 on average. Because the assignment of each treatment was
random at an individual level and the nature of the treatment assignment cre-
ated a variation in the proportion of respondents who received each amount
of CCT by village, the peer effect on vaccination behavior is identified using
such village-level random variations. The proportion of respondents receiv-
ing the highest amount of cash transfer (800 naira) ranges from 18.2 percent
to 60 percent with the average of 34.9 percent.
Neighbors
Literature suggests that the village might not be a correct unit in measuring
the spillover effect because information might spread only within the neigh-
borhood (Godlonton and Thornton, 2012). This study measured the GPS
coordinates of each respondent’s house in order to analyze the spillover ef-
fect within a closer geographical proximity than within a village. Because
the assignment of treatment status to respondents was random at an individ-
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ual level, the random assignment rule should also apply to their neighbors.
This study focuses on the neighbors who lived within 100 meters from each
respondent.4
Friends
In addition to geographical information, this project collected unique data
on friends for each respondent. Each respondent was asked to list the full
name of her friends in the same village who fell within the 6 categories: a
best friend, a friend whom she admires, a friend whom she talks about health
issues with, a friend whom she goes to health clinic together with, a friend
whom she visits when the friend is sick and a friend who visits her when she
is sick. Respondents were asked to list only one name for each category, but
the name could overlap across the different categories.
Data on listed friends was matched to names of respondents in the study.
The matching was done manually to increase the precision because mis-
spelling of names was common in the survey and at many times, there was
more than one way to correctly spell each name. Furthermore, the total
number of participated women in each village to find the match from was
not large (31.2 women per village on average).5
Among six friend-categories, the matching rate was relatively similar.
Approximately 25 percent of the names listed in each category were matched
to respondents in my study while 1.5 percent of respondents did not provide
any name for each category. The rest of approximately 73.4 percent of re-
spondents who listed the name of friends in each category were not matched
with any names of respondents. Reasons why names of friends listed were
4I also check the robustness of the analysis by using other distance such as 300 meters,
500 meters, and only the closest neighbor. I find that the main results do not change even
when I use the different definition of neighborhood based on the distance.
5I also coded each name of friends to match with respondents’ names to check the
precision of the manual matching. The manual matching achieves the higher matching
rate.
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not matched with any names who were also in the survey include that the
friend lived in a household that the survey team did not visit, or that the
friend was not eligible. I did not conduct a census which would have enabled
me to identify the reasons of unmatching because I would have known the
names of all the residents in each village.
I use the variation of vaccination behaviors among friends who also par-
ticipated in the study to evaluate the effect of friend’s vaccination status on
the likelihood that one receives a vaccine. This analysis is possible because
the vaccination decisions by friends have been randomly induced with cash
incentives, which were randomly assigned. Whenever I analyze the effect of
friends using the total sample, I treat friends who are outside of the study
as though they have not received a vaccine, in order to evaluate the lower
bound of the effect of friends.
Descriptive Statistics and Balancing Tests
My analysis of 3 social networks (village, neighborhood, and friends) is based
on 2,482 eligible women from a larger study. On average, one respondent
had about 13 neighbors who were also respondents of the study within 100
meters from her house. Among neighbors, around 34 percent of neighbors
were offered the highest CCT. While a respondent could list up to 6 names
of her friends, on average respondents listed 0.36 friends who were also in the
study. Among respondents who had at least one friend participated in the
study, the average respondent listed 1.15 friends. The proportion of friends
who were offered the highest CCT was about 30 percent among friends who
were in the study (Table 3.1 Panel A).
The proportion of neighbors who were offered the highest amount of CCT
was the lowest among respondents who were offered the highest amount of
CCT. This is because each village had approximately the equal proportion of
respondents with each amount of cash incentives. The proportion of friends
113
who were offered each amount of CCT, on the other hand, was not statisti-
cally different by treatment status of respondents. In the analysis, imbalances
are controlled with the village fixed effect.
In addition to evaluating the effect of various peers, I conduct a detailed
analysis of best friends. I do that by restricting the sample to 624 women
whose best friends were also the participants of the larger study. Because
the sample for this analysis is restricted to respondents who had friends par-
ticipating in the study, there might be a selection which violates the external
validity. However, this sample selection would not violate the internal va-
lidity because the treatment status assigned to respondents and friends are
random.
Table 3.1 Panel B shows the summary statistics of respondents who had
their best friends in the study by the amount of cash incentives randomly
assigned to each respondent. On average respondents were 25 years old and
around 45 percent of the sample were Muslim. More than half of the women
(46.6 percent) did not receive any form of education. Many respondents,
43 percent, had paid work and the average household earning last month
was 6,180 naira (approximately 41.2 US dollars). 15 percent had never been
married and 76.7 percent had at least one child. Around 16 percent of re-
spondents were pregnant at the time of baseline survey. The majority of
respondents, 73.7 percent, had previously visited the health clinic which was
assigned to each respondent under this study and the distance to the clinic
was on average 1.7 kilometers. Approximately 20 percent of respondents
lived within 500 meters from the health clinic and another 25 percent of re-
spondents lived within 500 meters to 1.5 km from the clinic. Overall, 40.8
percent of women had ever received tetanus-toxoid vaccination at least once.
Characteristics among 624 respondents who have their friends in the sur-
vey are similar to the characteristics among the total sample of 2,482 women
from the larger study (Table A3.1). However, there are some differences to
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be noted. Around 5 percentage points more of respondents with friends sur-
veyed were non-Muslim. It suggests that Muslim women might have been
constrained to have friends. I also find that although insignificant, respon-
dents whose friends also participated in the larger survey had around 300
naira ($2) more of the average household earning per capita in the previous
month than the average among the total sample, they were more likely to
have received at least some form of formal education, and were more likely
to have received the tetanus vaccination prior to the baseline survey. This is
suggestive that women who are socially connected have better economic and
social outcomes.
Table 3.1 Panel C shows the characteristics of respondents’ best friend.
Roughly 35 percent of best friends received the highest amount of CCT.
Twenty-five percent of respondents lived within 25 meters from their best
friends, and another 25 percent lived more than 135 meters away from their
best friends.
Randomization check in Table 3.1 (Panel B and C) finds very few dif-
ferences between treatment groups. For all the demographic variables listed
above, I could not reject the equality of means between each treatment except
the pregnancy status. On the other hand, I find that pregnancy status is pos-
itively correlated with the amount of CCT offered. I control for pregnancy
status in all my specifications.
3.3 Peer Effects
In this section, I study the effect of various social networks on vaccination
take-up. The units of social networks I use in this study are village, neigh-
borhood, and friend network. I overcome the methodological challenge of
measuring the effect of social networks by using the exogenous variation of
the amount of cash incentives offered to each peer which affected peers’ vacci-
115
nation decision. I find that peers’ vaccination behaviors within all the social
networks causally increases one’s vaccination take-up to a great extent.
3.3.1 Specification
I estimate the peer effect on one’s vaccination take-up with the following
regression:
Yij = α + β1NumV accinatedij + β2NumberWomenij +Xij
′µ+ ij (3.1)
where NumV accinatedij is the number of peers who received vaccination
in a village, within a neighborhood or among friends, and NumberWomenij
is the total number of women in the social network. In addition to individual-
level controls such as age and the education level that I introduced for the
previous regression specification, I also include the treatment variables that
each respondent received.
Because the independent variable NumV accinatedij is endogenous, I use
an instrumental variables strategy to causally measure the peer effect on
vaccination, relying on the fact that peers were randomly offered different
amount of CCT and that the amount of CCT strongly affect one’s vaccination
decision. I instrument NumV accinatedij in (3.1) with the number of peers
who received the highest amount of CCT. The first stage is
NumV accinatedij = α + β1NumCCT800ij +Xij
′µ+ ij (3.2)
where NumCCT800ij is the number of respondents who were offered the
highest amount of CCT (800 naira) in a village, within a neighborhood (100
meters radius), or among friends. I only use the highest amount of CCT
because this has the strongest effect on vaccine take-up.
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3.3.2 Strong Effect of Social Networks
Because I use IV estimator to identify social networks, I first show the strong
result of the first stage. There is a large and strong effect of the highest
amount of CCT on the vaccination take-up among the social networks (Ta-
ble A3.2). Specifically, one additional peer in a village offered the highest
amount of CCT increases the number of respondents receiving a vaccine in
the village by 2.3 people. Similarly, one additional neighbors with the highest
CCT increases the number of respondents receiving a vaccine in the neigh-
borhood by 0.54. Finally, if one additional friend is offered the highest CCT,
it increases the number of friends receiving the vaccination by 0.25. These
results, that peers with higher cash incentives increases their likelihood of
vaccination within any of the three social networks (village, neighbors, and
friends), are important first stage estimates in order for the instrument vari-
able strategy to be valid.
Using IV regressions, I find strong evidence of positive peer effects on
vaccination take-up (Table 3.2).6 If the number of women receiving a vac-
cination increases by one in one’s village, then a respondent is more likely
to receive a vaccine by 2.4 percentage points (Table 3,2 column 5). Simi-
larly, if the number of women who received a vaccination increases by one in
one’s neighborhood, then the probability that a respondent receives a vac-
cine increases by 3.6 percentage points (Table 3.2 column 6). Finally, if one
additional friend received a vaccination, it increases one’s vaccination take-
up by 17.2 percentage points (Table 3.2 column 7). Because the maximum
number of friends who were offered the highest amount of CCT is two, I also
consider the non-linear relationship between the number of friends and one’s
vaccination take-up (Table 3.2 column 8). I find that friend’s vaccination
increases one’s vaccination likelihood at the increasing rate.
6OLS regressions reveal the consistent results with IV regressions.
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The comparison of the magnitude of peer effects among the different defi-
nitions of social networks verifies that friends have the strongest influence on
vaccination behavior. The effect of neighbors on vaccination (3.6 percentage
points) is stronger than that within village (2.4 percentage points), although
the difference is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the effect of a
friend’s vaccination on one’s vaccination take-up (17.2 percentage points) is
much larger than the peer effect within a village and among neighbors. The
network of friends has a stronger influence on the decision to vaccinate than
the village network.
Here I examine possible channels through which social networks may af-
fect vaccination behavior, with a focus on information sharing, cost sharing,
and social learning from experience. First, information sharing should not
matter in this setting because all the respondents have received some infor-
mation about the vaccine. However, there is additional suggestive evidence
that knowledge about tetanus and vaccine is promoted among respondents
through peers, especially friends. Table A3.3 shows that respondents are
more likely to correctly state the causes and symptoms of tetanus (column
13) and are more likely to have higher perception of vaccine efficacy if they
have friend who have received a vaccine beforehand. Second, I find that
peers do not enhance vaccination behavior by social learning about others’
behavior. Table A3.4 presents that peers’ vaccination take-up prior to the
intervention to respondents do not increase respondents’ vaccination take-
up. Social learning about others’ behavior do not enhance vaccination, or
imitation is not the mechanism of positive spillover effect. Lastly, I have not
found evidence that respondents share costs of clinic visits nor do they share
cash incentives. Table A3.5 shows that the total amount of CCT offered to
peers do not change a respondent’s decision to vaccinate.
The last possibility is that the vaccination decision is made collectively
among peers. In fact, among respondents whose friends received a vaccine,
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34.6 percent of them visited a clinic together with their friends. This is
suggestive that peers gather after the intervention and then decide if they
want to receive vaccinations.
Overall, I find that social networks strongly enhance vaccination take-up
and the friend network is the most influential on the decision to get vacci-
nated. Suggestive evidence shows that mechanisms of positive peer effects
include information sharing and collective decision making, rather than cost
sharing or social learning from others’ experience.
3.4 Differential Effect of Best Friend
Previous section reveals the strong effect of friends on vaccination decision.
This section performs a detailed analysis of friends. Particularly, I focus on
best friends to evaluate the differential effect of such friends getting a vaccine
on one’s vaccination behavior by various factors such as distance and belief. I
find a strong effect of a best friend’s vaccination on one’s vaccination but that
the effect of a best friend’s vaccination varies depending on various factors,
such as distance to a clinic and between friends’ house, and beliefs about
vaccine safety.
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
I estimate the effect of having friends vaccinated on one’s vaccination take-up
with the following regression:
Yij = α + β1FriendV accinatedij +Xij
′µ+ ij (3.3)
where Yij is an outcome variable which indicates if a respondent i received
a vaccine. FriendV accinatedij is a dummy variable which indicates if a
respondent i’s friend has received a vaccine. X includes the size of village
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and a set of individual controls such as age, the education level as well as the
treatment status of the respondent.
Because the independent variable FriendV accinatedij is endogenous, I
use an instrumental variable strategy to causally measure the peer effect
on vaccination, relying on the fact that respondents’ friend were randomly
offered some amounts of CCT and that the amount of CCT strongly affects
one’s vaccination decision. I instrument FriendV accinatedij in (3.3) with a
dummy variable to indicate if the friend was offered the highest amount of
CCT. The first stage is
FriendV accinatedij = α + β1FriendCCT800ij +Xij
′µ+ ij (3.4)
where FriendCCT800ij is a dummy variable to indicate if the friend was
offered the highest amount of CCT (800 naira).
I evaluate the differential effect of friend in the following regression frame-
work:




where Hij is a variable which potentially changes the average effect of
the friend’s vaccination. In this study, I particularly focus on the distance to
the health clinic, the distance between a respondent’s house and her friend’s
house, and a respondent’s belief about vaccine side effects.
3.4.2 Results
Effect of Best Friend
It is natural to think that the extent to which a friend influences a person
varies depending on the strength of friendship (Oster and Thornton, 2012).
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This study first compares the effect of any friend getting vaccinated and that
of a best friend getting vaccinated.
Table 3.3 shows the effect of friends’ vaccination on one’s vaccine take-
up. Using IV estimator, column 4 shows that using the total sample of 2,482
women from the larger study, if any of a respondent’s friend has received a
vaccine, it increases the likelihood that the respondent also receives a vaccine
by 11.4 percentage points. Once I restrict the sample to respondents whose
friends also participated in the survey, any friend getting vaccinated increases
one’s vaccination probability by 20.6 percentage points (Column 2). Friends’
vaccination strongly influenced one’s vaccination decision.
I find that the effect of having a vaccinated friend is much larger if I
restrict the sample to women whose friends are also in the survey than when
I use the total sample (Table 3.3 column 4 and 5). This result indicates that
if one’s friend is not in the survey, the respondent is less likely to receive a
vaccine than when her friend is in the survey but she is not vaccinated.
Among various definitions of friends, I find that a best friend’s vaccina-
tion particularly has a strong effect on one’s vaccination decision (Table 3.3
column 6). If a respondent’s best friend has received a vaccine, it increases
one’s likelihood of vaccination by 25.8 percentage points. This seemingly
large effect is potentially due to the fact that all the women in this analysis
have received some cash incentives, ranging from 5 naira to 800 naira. Put
the result differently, I find that if a respondent has an incentive to get vac-
cinated, she is 25.8 percentage points less likely to receive a vaccine if her
best friend does not go.7
Because the effect of a best friend’s vaccination was large, I focus on the
differential effect of a best friend in the following analysis.
7The analysis which examines the effect of friend on vaccination among women who
did not receive any treatment is not possible in this study, because I did not collect the
data on vaccination decision among women who did not participate in the survey in each
village
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Interaction between Best Friend’s Vaccination and CCT
My estimate of the impact of the best friend’s vaccination indicated the pos-
itive effect on one’s receiving a vaccine. It is important for policy purposes
to evaluate if having a best friend vaccinated can substitute cash incentives
in promoting vaccination behavior. Another possibility is that a best friend’s
vaccination is influential only when one receives cash incentives for vaccina-
tion.
Table 3.4 shows the substitution of the effect of the amount of CCT a
respondent received and best friend’s vaccination. Although the analysis find
that none of the coefficients is significant presumably because it suffers from
under-power issue, the result shows suggestive evidence that the effect of the
friend’s vaccination substitutes the effect of CCT. Especially, if a respondent
was offered the medium amount of CCT (300 naira, or $2), the effect of
the best friend’s vaccination on one’s vaccination decision is lower by 12.8
percentage points than when she was offered the lowest amount of CCT. And
if a respondent was offered the highest amount of CCT (800 naira, or $5),
the effect of the best friend’s vaccination is lower by 17. 7 percentage points.
Distance to Health Clinic
The distance to a health clinic is one of the major reasons for low health
service utilization (Thornton, 2008). The best friend might help one mitigate
the cost of long distance to a clinic, either psychologically or financially, while
a woman might not need her peers if she has an easy access to a health clinic
because the cost of attending the clinic is not large.
Table 3.5 (column 1) shows the differential effect of best friend’s vacci-
nation by the distance to a health clinic. I construct a dummy variable to
indicate the distance to a health clinic, and the cut-off of the distance variable
I use is every 25 percent of the distribution of the distance.
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If the distance from the respondent’s house to a health clinic is less than
500 meters, the effect of a best friend’s vaccination is statistically and eco-
nomically null. However, the effect of a best friend’s vaccination gets larger
as the distance to a health clinic gets longer. If the distance to a health clinic
is within 0.5 to 1.5 km, the influence of the best friend’s vaccination is 14.3
percentage points more than the case if the distance is less than 500 meters,
although the effect is insignificant. If the distance to a health clinic is within
1.5 to 2.5 km, the influence of the best friend’s vaccination is 89.9 percentage
points more than the case if the distance is less than 500 meters.
This effect is extremely large, but the effect of the distance to the clinic
(1.5 to 2.5 km) is also very large: among respondents whose best friends did
not receive a vaccine, if the clinic is 1.5 to 2.5 km away from one’s house, the
likelihood of one’s receiving a vaccine is 73.6 percentage points less than if
the distance is 500 meters or less. Thus the best friend’s vaccination is 16.3
percentage points among respondents who live within 1.5 to 2.5 km from the
clinic.
This result indicates that social networks influence one’s vaccination de-
cision especially when the distance to the clinic is far. One of the potential
reasons why the social network matters when the distance to the clinic is
far is that peers help one overcome the financial and psychological barriers
to visit the health clinic. If the health clinic is far, one might have stronger
incentives to visit the clinic together with her peers so that they share the
transportation cost. Peers might also help mitigate her psychological costs
to visit a health clinic when it is far if she travels together with her peers. In
fact, I find that respondents are around 15.9 percentage points more likely
to visit the health clinic together with her friend if the clinic is within 500
meters to 2.5 km away from the respondent’s house than if the clinic is less
than 500 meters away (Table A3.6 column 1). This is suggestive evidence
that social networks influence one’s vaccination when the clinic is located
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far because peers mitigate the cost of the clinic visit by attending the clinic
together.
Distance between Best Friends’ House
Geographical proximity is a strong factor that one gets influenced by another.
I presented the result that a woman living nearby to someone who received
a vaccine was more likely to receive a vaccine (Table 3.2 column 5). The
question I evaluate here is if friends can be equally influential no matter
where they are, when the friendship is strong (best friend). I find that the
influence of a best friend’s vaccination quickly fades as the distance between
friends’ house gets longer.
Table 3.5 (column 2) shows the differential effect of a best friend’s vac-
cination by the distance between a respondent’s house and her best friend’s
house. I construct a dummy variable to indicate the distance between a re-
spondent and her best friend in a similar way as the one for the distance to
a health clinic. The cut-off of the dummy variable I use is every 25 percent
of the distribution of the distance.
If the distance between a respondent’s house and her best friend’s house is
less than 25 meters, the best friend’s vaccination increases one’s probability
of getting vaccinated by 62.6 percentage points. On the other hand, as the
distance between a respondent’s house and her best friend gets longer, the
influence of the best friend’s vaccination on vaccination gets weaker. In fact,
if the best friend lives more than 25 meters away from where the respondent
lives, the best friend’s vaccination does not affect one’s vaccination decision.
Specifically, if the best friend lives within 25 to 55 meters from the respon-
dent, the influence of the best friend’s vaccination is 13.6 percentage points
less than the case when the best friend lives within 25 meters, and if the best
friend lives more than 135 meters away from the respondent, the influence
of the best friend’s vaccination is 83.5 percentage points less than the case
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when the best friend lives within 25 meters.
This result indicates that social networks influence one’s vaccination de-
cision especially when the distance between best friends is close. Best friends
who live close are easier to coordinate to visit the clinic together than those
who live far, and as a result, friends who live nearby influence one’s vaccina-
tion decision more than friends who do not. As suggestive evidence, Table
A3.6 (column 2) shows the distance between a respondent’s and her best
friend’s house is negatively correlated with the probability that a respondent
attends a clinic together with a friend. If the best friend lives more than
135 meters away, the respondent is 25.6 percentage points less likely to visit
the clinic together with her friend than when the best friend lives within 25
meters. Living nearby to her best friend promotes one to attending the clinic
together with her best friend, and that promotes more vaccination behaviors.
Concerns for Vaccine Safety
Perceptions greatly influence vaccination behaviors across the globe (Larson
et al., 2014). This section examines if other people’s perceptions affect one’s
vaccination behavior. If a best friend’s vaccination behavior is a significant
determinant of one’s behavior, the best friend’s perception might influence
one’s behavior as well.
Table 3.6 (column 1) shows the differential effect of the best friend’s vac-
cination by the subjective belief of a respondent about vaccine safety. Specif-
ically, if the respondent thinks that vaccines do not have side effects, then
the vaccination by her best friend increases the likelihood that one receives
a vaccine by 49.5 percentage points. On the other hand, the best friend’s
vaccination does not affect one’s vaccination decision if the respondent think
that the vaccination has side effects.
Similarly, column 2 shows that if the respondent’s best friend thinks that
vaccines do not have side effects, then the vaccination by her best friend
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increases the likelihood that one receives a vaccine by 37.0 percentage points.
On the other hand, the best friend does not affect one’s vaccination decision
if the respondent’s best friend thinks that the vaccination has side effects.
Table 3.6 (column 3) shows that if either a respondent or her best friend
thinks that vaccines have side effects, the effect of the best friend’s vaccina-
tion on one’s vaccination decision is 66.2 percentage points less than when
both the respondent and her friend think that vaccine have no side effects.
These results indicate that the effectiveness of social networks on vaccination
depends largely on one’s belief on vaccination.
Finally, Table A3.7 shows the correlation between a respondent’s belief
and her friend’s belief by the distance between their houses. I find that
there is a strong positive correlation between beliefs between a respondent
and her best friend if the distance is less than 25 meters. However, this
positive correlation of the belief drastically weakens as the distance between
a respondent and her friend gets longer. Results on the differential effect of
a best friend’s vaccination by the distance between friends’ houses and by
one’s belief reveal that both friends’ networks and distances are important
factors to affect one’s vaccination behavior.
3.5 Conclusion
Although the role of social networks in health behaviors received increasing
attentions in the literature, it is important to evaluate if there are differential
effects of peers depending on their characteristics. This paper examines the
effect of various social networks as well as the differential effect of the best
friend’s vaccination on one’s vaccination decision.
I find that social networks increase vaccination significantly and especially
the influence of a friend’s vaccination is large on one’s vaccination decision.
Among best friends, their vaccination decisions influence one’s vaccination
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decision if one resides more than 1.5 km away from the health clinic. The
best friend’s vaccination influences one’s vaccination decision only when the
best friend lives close to the respondent. Finally, the best friend’s vaccination
status does not affect one’s vaccination decision if either the respondent or
her best friend has concerns about side effects of vaccines.
This exercise reveals that the friend network is influential on vaccination
behaviors but at the same time, the distance to a health clinic or to a friend’s
house and one’s belief determine how strong the effect of friend’s vaccination
could be.
Past studies have emphasized the importance of peers in promoting health
behaviors without detailed examinations on what kind of peers has more
influence than others. I contribute to social network literature because this is
the first study in measuring the causal effect of social networks on vaccination
in Africa.
I also contribute to the literature by evaluating the differential effect of
peers’ vaccination by the distance to health clinics, the distance between
peers, and by one’s belief. Results of the study reveal several important
policy implications. First, interventions to promote health behaviors using
peers should target population which has a difficult access to health facilities.
Second, peers might not be sufficient to evenly promote health behaviors. It is
crucial to implement information campaign to emphasize the benefit of health
behaviors in order for social networks to effectively function to improve health
behaviors particularly in remote areas where the health service utilization as
well as the perceived benefit of the health service is low.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Peers 
# peers in 100 meters 2482 13.261 14.180 13.179 0.041
% peers offered CCT800  in 100 meters 2482 0.343 0.354 0.332 0.020
# friends listed and matched 2482 0.348 0.384 0.359 0.447
# friends offered CCT800 2482 0.101 0.128 0.121 0.207
Panel B: Respondent's characteristics 
Age 624 24.848 25.033 25.597 0.413
Highest education = no education 624 0.492 0.460 0.449 0.661
Not married 624 0.152 0.161 0.171 0.872
Muslim 624 0.416 0.464 0.444 0.618
Received tetanus vaccine before 624 0.462 0.384 0.384 0.185
Have paid work 624 0.442 0.393 0.458 0.375
Used clinic before 624 0.706 0.763 0.741 0.417
Distance to health clinic (km) 624 1.807 1.706 1.662 0.492
Have children 624 0.777 0.773 0.755 0.852
Pregnant 619 0.118 0.163 0.199 0.083
Earning per capita (naira) 624 5456.9 6524.9 6502.6 0.410
Distance to Clinic (less than 0.5km) 624 0.188 0.190 0.213 0.767
Distance to Clinic (0.5-1.5km) 624 0.254 0.275 0.278 0.839
Distance to Clinic (1.5-2.5km) 624 0.274 0.275 0.255 0.868
Distance to Clinic (more than 2.5km) 624 0.284 0.261 0.255 0.776
Respondent thinks vaccine has side effects 624 0.675 0.711 0.616 0.109
Panel C: Best friend's characteristics 
Best friend received CCT800 624 0.340 0.417 0.389 0.273
Best friend's age 624 25.234 25.289 25.012 0.880
Best friend = muslim 624 0.404 0.488 0.438 0.222
Best friend received no education 624 0.492 0.464 0.414 0.269
Distance to Best Friend (less than 25m) 624 0.249 0.242 0.255 0.953
Distance to Best Friend (25-55m) 624 0.223 0.270 0.245 0.549
Distance to Best Friend (55-135m) 624 0.254 0.270 0.241 0.785
Distance to Best Friend (more than 135m) 624 0.274 0.218 0.259 0.396
Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects 624 0.678 0.659 0.650 0.837
Table 3.1: Randomization Check
Notes: Sample used here is the total sample of 2,482 women in panel A, and the sample of 624 women who listed
another respondent in the survey as a friend in Panel B and C. 150 naira = $1 approximately. * significant at 10%;




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# peers vaccinated in a village 0.017*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.004)
# peers vaccinated in 100 meters 0.044*** 0.036***
(0.005) (0.013)
# friends vaccinated 0.109*** 0.172*
(0.037) (0.091)
# friends vaccinated = 1 0.111*** 0.168*
(0.039) (0.096)
# friends vaccinated = 2 0.208** 0.453**
(0.080) (0.185)
Observations 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482
R-squared 0.263 0.281 0.352 0.352 0.255 0.278 0.350 0.348
Mean of dependent var 0.726 0.726 0.702 0.702 0.726 0.726 0.702 0.702
Covariates X X X X X X X X
Fixed effect by clinic (10 clinics) X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 clinics) X X X X
Table 3.2: Effect of Social Networks
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,482 women whose household location is recorded with GPS coordinates
(8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates). "# peers vaccinated in a village" represents the number of women in a
village who received the tetanus vaccine excluding the respondent. "# peers vaccinated in 100 meters" represents the
number of women within 100 meters from a respondent's house who received the tetanus vaccine. "# friends vaccinated" is
the number of respondent's friends received tetanus vaccine. "Friends" are defined as someone whom each respondent
listed in either one of 6 categories: a best friend, a friend whom they admire, a friend whom they talk about health issues
with, a friend whom they go to health clinic together with, a friend whom they visit if she is sick, a friend who visits them
when they are sick. The instrument used in IV regression for "# peers vaccinated in a village" is "# peers offered CCT800
in a village ". The instrument used in IV regression for "# peers vaccinated in 100 meters" is "# peers offered CCT800  in
100 meters". The instrument used in IV regression for "# friends vaccinated" is "# friends offered CCT800". Robust
standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. Covariates include own treatment status (Clinic CCT,
Vaccine CCT & Fear, CCT300, CCT800), interaction term between Clinic CCT and each CCT dummy, and between
Vaccine CCT & Fear and each CCT dummy, total number of respondents in the village in (1) and (5), total number
respondents within 100 meters in (2) and (6), or total number of friends listed in (3) (4) (7) (8), age, education level,
marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to
the clinic.  The average number of women in one village is 31.235. The average number of women in 100 meters is
13.547. The average number of friends one lists who were also in the study  is 0.36. Conditioned on having at least 1
friend, the number of friends a respondents lists who were in the study is 1.15. Mean of Dependent Variable is overall
mean in (1), (2), (5), (6), and mean if no friend received a vaccine in (3), (4), (7), and (8). * significant at 10%; **






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any friend received vaccine 0.099*** 0.110** 0.114* 0.206*
(0.036) (0.052) (0.069) (0.111)
Best friend received vaccine 0.041 0.258*
(0.054) (0.142)
Constant 0.156 -0.587** 0.850** -0.337 -1.440*** -0.247
(0.159) (0.284) (0.395) (0.283) (0.531) (0.420)
Observations 2482 775 624 2482 775 624
R-squared 0.349 0.421 0.403 0.349 0.416 0.376
Mean of dependent var among control 0.694 0.464 0.464 0.694 0.464 0.464
Covariates X X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80) X X X X X X
Table 3.3: Effect of Friends
Notes: Sample used in (1) & (4) is the total sample of 2,482 women who participated in the larger survey. Survey
used in (2) & (5) is the sample of 775 women who listed some respondents who also participated in the survey as
friends.  Sample used in (3) & (6) is the sample of 624 women who listed another respondent in the survey as a best
friend. Robust standard errors clustered by villages are presented. The instrument used in IV regression for "Any
friend received vaccine" is "Any friend received CCT800", and the instrument for "Best friend received vaccine" is
"Best friend received CCT800". Covariates include the total number of women who participated in the survey in a
village, own treatment status (CCT300, CCT800), age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus
vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic. 150 naira = $1




Dependent variable: Received vaccine
(1)
Best friend received vaccine 0.336
(0.310)
Best friend received vaccine * CCT300 -0.128
(0.330)










Mean of dependent var among control 0.269
Covariates X
Fixed effect by village (80) X
Notes: Sample used here is the sample of 624 women who listed another respondent in the survey
as a friend. Robust standard errors clustered by villages are presented. The instrument used in IV
regression for "Best friend received vaccine" is "Best friend received CCT800". Covariates
include age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid
work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic. 150 naira = $1 approximately. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




Best friend received vaccine 0.023 0.626**
(0.283) (0.277)
Best friend received vaccine * Distance to clinic (0.5-1.5km) 0.143
(0.374)
Best friend received vaccine * Distance to clinic (1.5-2.5km) 0.899*
(0.514)
Best friend received vaccine * Distance to clinic (more than 2.5km) 0.105
(0.357)
Distance to clinic (0.5-1.5km) -0.134
(0.298)
Distance to clinic (1.5-2.5km) -0.736*
(0.433)
Distance to clinic (more than 2.5km) -0.230
(0.281)
Best friend received vaccine * Distance to best friend (25-55m) -0.136
(0.438)
Best friend received vaccine * Distance to best friend (55-135m) -0.523
(0.358)
Best friend received vaccine * Distance to best friend (more than 135m) -0.835**
(0.358)
Distance to best friend (25-55m) 0.054
(0.356)
Distance to best friend (55-135m) 0.413
(0.300)






Mean of dependent var among control 0.500 0.383
Covariates X X
Fixed effect by village (80) X
p-values of F-test: Best friend received vaccine + (……. ) = 0 
 + Best friend received vaccine * Distance to clinic (0.5-1.5km) = 0 0.441
 + Best friend received vaccine * Distance to clinic (1.5-2.5km) = 0 0.051
 + Best friend received vaccine * Distance to clinic (more than 2.5km) = 0 0.518
 + Best friend received vaccine * Distance to best Friend (25-55m) = 0 0.123
 + Best friend received vaccine * Distance to best Friend (55-135m) = 0 0.624
 + Best friend received vaccine * Distance to best Friend (more than 135m) = 0 0.441
Table 3.5: Differential Effect of Friends - Distance
Received vaccine
Notes: Sample used here is the sample of 624 women who listed another respondent in the survey as a friend.
The threshold of the distance is defined as every 25% of the distribution. Robust standard errors clustered by
villages are presented. The instrument used in IV regression for "Best friend received vaccine" is "Best friend
received CCT800". Covariates include age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine
before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 140
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Best friend received vaccine 0.495** 0.370* 0.807**
(0.225) (0.213) (0.344)
Best friend received vaccine * (Respondent thinks vaccine has side effects) -0.384
(0.258)
Respondent thinks vaccine has side effects 0.310
(0.214)
Best friend received vaccine * (Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects) -0.222
(0.256)
Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects 0.138
(0.200)
Best friend received vaccine * (Respondent or best friend thinks vaccine has side effects) -0.662*
(0.351)
Respondent or best friend thinks vaccine has side effects 0.465
(0.309)
Constant -0.636 -0.329 -0.733
(0.486) (0.472) (0.558)
Observations 624 624 624
R-squared 0.408 0.438 0.403
Mean of dependent var among control 0.522 0.500 0.493
Covariates X X X
Fixed effect by village (80) X X X
p-values of F-tes: Best friend received vaccine + (……. ) = 0 
 + Best friend received vaccine * (Respondent thinks vaccine has side effects) = 0 0.513
 + Best friend received vaccine * (Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects) = 0 0.389
 + Best friend received vaccine * (Respondent or best friend thinks vaccine has side effects) = 0 0.334
Received vaccine
Table 3.6: Differential Effect of Friends - Side effects
Notes: Sample used here is the sample of 624 women who listed another respondent in the survey as a friend. Robust standard
errors clustered by villages are presented. The instrument used in IV regression for "Best friend received vaccine" is "Best
friend received CCT800". Covariates include age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if











Age 25.108 25.170 0.821
Highest education = no education 0.483 0.466 0.455
Not married 0.153 0.162 0.574
Muslim 0.496 0.442 0.017
Received tetanus vaccine before 0.398 0.409 0.643
Have paid work 0.435 0.431 0.856
Used clinic before 0.722 0.737 0.460
Distance to health clinic (km) 1.718 1.723 0.937
Have children 0.765 0.768 0.878
Pregnant 0.182 0.162 0.242
Earning per capita (naira) 5875.511 6180.017 0.417
Table A3.1: Baseline Characteristics by Sample
Notes: Sample used here is the total sample of 2,482 women in column (1), and the sample of 624
women who listed another respondent in the survey as a best friend in column (2). 150 naira = $1












# peers offered CCT800 in a village 2.292***
(0.503)
# peers offered CCT800 in 100 meters 0.542***
(0.135)
# friends offered CCT800 0.245***
(0.032)
Observations 2482 2482 2482
R-squared 0.958 0.852 0.745
Mean of dependent var 36.956 9.947 0.268
Mean of independent var 16.988 4.604 0.149
Covariates X X X
Fixed effect by clinic (10 clinics) X X
Fixed effect by village (80 clinics) X
Table A3.2: Effect of Social Networks: First Stage
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,482 women whose household location is
recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates)."# peers offered
CCT800 in a village" represents the number of women in a village whowere offered CCT800.
"# peers offered CCT800 in 100 meters" is the number of women in 100 meters from a
respondents who were offered CCT800. "# friends offered CCT800" is the number of
respondent's friends who were offered CCT800. "Friends" are defined as someone whom each
respondent listed in either one of 6 categories: a best friend, a friend whom they admire, a
friend whom they talk about health issues with, a friend whom they go to health clinic together
with, a friend whom they visit they she is sick, a friend who visits them when they are sick.
Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. Covariates include
ClinicCCT, VaccineCCT&Fear, CCT300, CCT800, total number of respondents in the village
in (1), total number of respondents within 100 meters in (2), or total number of friends listed in
(3), age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid
work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic.  The average number of women
in one village is 31.235. The average number of women in 100 meters is 13.547. The average
number of friends one lists who were also in the study  is 0.36. Conditioned on having at least
1 friend, the number of friends a respondents lists who were in the study is 1.15. Mean of
Dependent Variable is the overall mean. Mean of Independent Variable is overall mean in (1)
and (2), and mean if no friends received CCT800 in (3). * significant at 10%; ** significant at
























Panel A: Village (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% peers vaccinated in a village before one's intervention 0.053 -2.332 0.018 0.076** 0.030 1.129
(0.090) (1.595) (0.029) (0.034) (0.040) (1.669)
Observations 2460 2455 2460 2460 2460 2457
R-squared 0.026 0.011 0.043 0.025 0.028 0.014
Mean of dependent var 3.513 30.151 0.356 0.434 0.495 22.254
Covariates X X X X X X
Fixed effect by clinic (10 clinics) X X X X X X
Panel B: Neighborhood (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
% peers vaccinated in 100 meters before one's intervention 0.132 0.146 -0.016 -0.000 -0.007 3.171**
(0.091) (1.280) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (1.368)
Observations 2417 2412 2417 2417 2417 2414
R-squared 0.030 0.010 0.043 0.023 0.028 0.017
Mean of dependent var 3.513 30.151 0.356 0.434 0.495 22.254
Covariates X X X X X X
Fixed effect by clinic (10 clinics) X X X X X X
Panel C: Friends (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Any friends vaccinated before one's intervention 0.206** 1.245 0.008 0.009 0.001 3.656**
(0.079) (1.244) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (1.786)
Observations 2460 2455 2460 2460 2460 2457
R-squared 0.028 0.013 0.043 0.028 0.032 0.019
Mean of dependent var 3.499 30.449 0.357 0.447 0.507 22.312
Covariates X X X X X X
Fixed effect by village (80 clinics) X X X X X X
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,482 women whose household location is recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS
coordinates). % peers vaccinated in a village before one's intervention" represents the percentage of women in a village who received the tetanus vaccine
before the respondent. "% peers vaccinated in 100 meters before one's intervention" represents the percentage of women within 100 meters from a
respondent's house who received the tetanus vaccine after the respondent. "Any friends vaccinated before one's intervention" is the dummy variable which
takes 1 if any of respondent's friends received tetanus vaccine before the respondent. "Friends" are defined as someone whom each respondent listed in either
one of 6 categories: a best friend, a friend whom they admire, a friend whom they talk about health issues with, a friend whom they go to health clinic
together with, a friend whom they visit if she is sick, a friend who visits them when they are sick. Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages)
are presented. The average number of women in one village is 31.235. The average number of women in 100 meters is 13.547. The average number of
friends one lists who were also in the study  is 0.36. Conditioned on having at least 1 friend, the number of friends a respondents lists who were in the study
is 1.15. All the dependent variables indicate the measurement before the flipcharts intervention. "# of correct answers" counts the number of questions that
the respondent answered correctly about tetanus. "Number of people who die of tetanus" is a number of people out of 100 a respondent provided to a
question "Once they have Tetanus, how many people do you think would die because of Tetanus?". "Very worried about tetanus" is a binary variable which
takes 1 if a respondent answers "very worried" to the question "How worried are you that you might get tetanus? Very worried, worried, not too worried, not
worried at all?". "Tetanus is very bad" is a binary variable which takes 1 is a respondent answers "very bad" to the question "How bad would it be if you get
tetanus? Very bad, bad, not too bad, not bad at all?". "Very important to be protected from tetanus" is a binary variable which takes 1 is a respondent answers
"very important" to the question "How important is it for you to make sure that you are protected from tetanus? Very important, important, not too important,
not important at all?" "Vaccine efficacy" is the difference between hypothetical number of unvaccinated people who get tetanus and number of vaccinated
people who get tetanus. "Correct # of answers" is the number of answers about sympstoms and causes of tetanus.The total number of questions is 6.
Covariates include own treatment status (Clinic CCT, Vaccine CCT & Fear, CCT300, CCT800), interaction term between Clinic CCT and each CCT
dummy, and between Vaccine CCT & Fear and each CCT dummy, total number of respondents in the village in panela A, total number respondents within
100 meters in panel B, or total number of friends listed in panel C, age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has
paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic. Mean of Dependent Variable is overall mean in (1) to (12), and mean if no friend
received a vaccine in (13) to (18). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




# peers vaccinated in a village before one's intervention -0.002
(0.002)
# peers vaccinated in 100 meters before one's intervention 0.003
(0.011)
# friends vaccinated before one's intervention 0.244
(0.358)
Observations 2482 2482 2482
R-squared 0.198 0.196 0.343
Mean of dependent var 0.682 0.699 0.725
Covariates X X X
Fixed effect X X X
Coefficient of first stage 4.290*** 0.612*** 0.076**
(0.901) (0.184) (0.030)
Table A3.4: Mechanism: Learning from Others' Vaccination
Received Vaccine
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,482 women whose household location is recorded with
GPS coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS coordinates). "# peers vaccinated in a village before one's
intervention" is number of women in a village who received a vaccine before one received an interview. "#
peers vaccinated in 100 meters before one's intervention" is the number of neighbors who received a
vaccine before one received an interview.  "# friends vaccinated before one's intervention" is the number of
friends who received a vaccine before one received an interview. Each of main independent variables was
instrumented with number of peers in the social network who were interviewed before one's interview and
offered CCT800. Robust standard errors clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. Covariates
include ClinicCCT, VaccineCCT&Fear, CCT300, CCT800, and interaction between each treatment,  age,
education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used
the clinic before, and distance to the clinic.  Mean of Dependent Variable is mean if no peers received




Total CCT among neighbors -0.001
(0.001)




Mean of Dependent Variable 0.726 0.726
Covariates X X
Fixed effect by village (80 villages) X X
Table A3.5: Mechanism: Cost Sharing
Received Vaccine
Notes:  Sample used here is the main sample of 2,482 women whose household
location is recorded with GPS coordinates (8 have a missing value on GPS
coordinates). Because coefficients are very small, the table shows the coefficients *
100. "Total CCT among neighbors" represents the total amount of CCT that
neighbors of a respondent were offered in 100 meters. "Total CCT among friends"
represents the total amount of CCT that friends of a respondent were offered. The
number does not include the amount that a respondent was offered. "Friends" are
defined as someone whom each respondent listed in either one of 6 categories: a
best friend, a friend whom they admire, a friend whom they talk about health issues
with, a friend whom they go to health clinic together with, a friend whom they visit
they she is sick, a friend who visits them when they are sick. Robust standard errors
clustered by villages (80 villages) are presented. Covariates include CCT300,
CCT800, total number of respondents within 100 meters in (1), or total number of
friends listed in (2), age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus
vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the
clinic. Mean of Dependent Variable is overall mean. * significant at 10%; **




Distance to clinic (0.5-1.5km) 0.159**
(0.072)
Distance to clinic (1.5-2.5km) 0.151
(0.150)
Distance to clinic (more than 2.5km) -0.011
(0.133)
Distance to best friend (25-55m)  -0.166***
(0.062)
Distance to best friend (55-135m) -0.232***
(0.071)






Mean of dependent var among control 0.080 0.419
Covariates X X
Fixed effect by village (80) X X
Visited Clinic with Friends
Table A3.6: Distance and Clinic Attendance with Friends 
Notes: Sample used here is the sample of 624 women who listed another respondent in
the survey as a friend. Robust standard errors clustered by villages are presented. The
dependent variable "Visited Clinic with Friends" is a dummy variable which takes 1 if
the respondent had a follow-up survey at the health clinic within 20 minutes from when
her friend had a follow-up survey at the same health clinic.The threshold of the distance
is defined as every 25% of the distribution. Covariates include own treatment status
(CCT300, CCT800), age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus
vaccine before, if has paid work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the







Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects 0.358***
(0.078)
Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects * Distance to best friend (25-55m) -0.263**
(0.109)
Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects * Distance to best friend (55-135m) -0.255**
(0.110)
Best friend thinks vaccine has side effects * Distance to best friend (more than 135m) -0.315***
(0.109)
Distance to best friend (25-55m) 0.156*
(0.089)
Distance to best friend (55-135m) 0.126
(0.090)






Mean of dependent var among control 0.509
Covariates X
Table A3.7: Correlation of Belief among Friends 
Notes: Sample used here is the sample of 624 women who listed another respondent in the survey as a friend. The
threshold of the distance is defined as every 25% of the distribution. Robust standard errors clustered by villages are
presented. Covariates include age, education level, marital status, religion, if received tetanus vaccine before, if has paid
work, if ever used the clinic before, and distance to the clinic. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%
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